Volume 8, Issue 2 , Winter and Spring 2018, , Pages 29-56
Abstract
This article argues that “democracy” does not necessarily guarantee “liberty” and “human rights,” and analyzes the causes of such an inconsistency and the solutions for reconciling them in the ideas of James Madison, Alexis de Tocqueville, and John Stuart Mill. The ...
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This article argues that “democracy” does not necessarily guarantee “liberty” and “human rights,” and analyzes the causes of such an inconsistency and the solutions for reconciling them in the ideas of James Madison, Alexis de Tocqueville, and John Stuart Mill. The US founding fathers and the Federalist authors, found out the possibility of the emergence of this inconsistency and, following Locke and Montesquieu, proposed a set of “institutional devices” such as “separation of powers,” “a system of representation,” “a system of checks and balances,” and “legal guarantees of minority rights” to defend “liberty” and “human rights.” However, distinguishing “social and cultural causes” from “political and institutional causes,” this article believes that this problem in “democracy” is too complicated to be solved by mere “institutional devices.” It argues that “violating minority rights,” “suppression,” “tyranny of the majority,” and “despotism of the custom” are still possible even in a democratic system, and it is impossible to solve them by mere “institutional devices.” So, using Tocqueville’s observations and argumentations in Democracy of America, his distinction between “mild despotism” and “tyranny of the majority,” and also the concept of “public consent” in Noam Chomsky’s and Edward S. Herman’s Manufacturing Consent, this article analyzes the possible types of “tyranny” and “despotism” in a democratic system, the effect of “mild despotism” on “self-censorship,” “political and social pressures on the dissenters,” and incapability of the mere “institutional device”" in solving these problems. Then, it shows the development of the theory of “mild despotism” in Mill’s theory of “despotism of the custom,” and analyzes his argumentation that it is more dangerous than “political despotism” for “development and welfare in society.” Finally, it analyzes Mill’s theoretical and practical proposals for solving this problem.
Volume 3, Issue 2 , Winter and Spring 2013, , Pages 35-56
Abstract
The main aim of this paper is to describe and analyze one of the most significant criticisms of classical utilitarianism in the Anglo-Saxon philosophical tradition. This criticism, called the “integrity criticism,” was put forward by Bernard Williams in 1973 and, along with the so-called ...
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The main aim of this paper is to describe and analyze one of the most significant criticisms of classical utilitarianism in the Anglo-Saxon philosophical tradition. This criticism, called the “integrity criticism,” was put forward by Bernard Williams in 1973 and, along with the so-called “justice criticism” which was put forward by John Rawls in 1971, is counted as the most significant criticism of classical utilitarianism. It argues that utilitarianism threatens the agent’s “integrity” and “autonomy,” and brings extensive “alienation” from her considered moral judgments and friendly and lovely relationships. This paper describes Bernard William’s criticism of classical utilitarianism and its various guises. Then, using Roger Crisp’s, Julia Driver’s, and Timothy Chappell’s interpretations, it analyzes it from various perspectives. Analyzing the “integrity criticism” in its various guises enriches our understanding of “utilitarianism” and helps us to find out how and why its different forms have been put forward.
