mohsen fazeli; qolamhosein tavakkoli
Volume 6, Issue 2 , Winter and Spring 2016, , Pages 67-88
Abstract
Berlin, by emphasizing on Incommensurability and Incomparability of ethical values defends a kind of value pluralism. He believes that there are no general categories and common criterions to judge with in morality and therefore there is no way to determine and evaluate the right actions from the wrong ...
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Berlin, by emphasizing on Incommensurability and Incomparability of ethical values defends a kind of value pluralism. He believes that there are no general categories and common criterions to judge with in morality and therefore there is no way to determine and evaluate the right actions from the wrong ones. On the other hand it seems that relativism also, by refusing any objectivity in ethics, and by emphasizing the lack of general standards for judgment rejects moral monism, and by relaying on differences between cultures, attains to common borders with pluralism. But Berlin tries to separate his own valve pluralism from relativism. In first half of this article we will SURVEY Berlin's value pluralism and in the second half it will be shown that Berlin's efforts for distancing from relativism is not so successful.
