Occidental Studies

Abstract Introduction
This article investigates Richard Wollheim’s ontological conception of the artwork, focusing on how his view is shaped by the later philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein and, in particular, by the notion of ‘form of life’. The central aim is to understand how Wollheim replaces the philosophical quest for an essential definition of art with a model grounded in recognition, possibility, and contextual understanding. Both Wittgenstein and Wollheim critique essentialism: they challenge the assumption that artworks share a single defining property, and instead emphasize heterogeneity, linguistic and cultural practices, and the multiplicity of responses artworks invite. Wollheim’s project is an attempt to expand the horizon of how artworks are understood by resisting the metaphysical desire to capture the essence of art. Thus, the article develops an interpretive pathway from Wittgenstein’s reflections on language, meaning, and the rejection of overarching theories to Wollheim’s reconceptualization of the being of the artwork as something rooted in practices, expectations, and forms of life.
 
Material and Method
The study employs a ‘descriptive–analytical methodology’, using a close reading of primary and secondary philosophical sources. Its method parallels Wittgenstein’s own anti-theoretical approach: instead of constructing new definitions, it clarifies how concepts function within their linguistic and cultural contexts. The data is gathered through library-based research, beginning with an overview of analytic aesthetics and its historical shift from logical analysis toward more culturally embedded forms of conceptual investigation.
The textual body based on Wollheim’ book ‘Art and its Objects’ and later essays in which he elaborates his views on artistic intention, perception, and the ontology of work of art.
The conceptual method proceeds in three steps:
1. ‘Reconstruction of analytic aesthetics’—examining how twentieth-century philosophers moved from essentialist definitions of art to anti-essentialist or family-resemblance models.
2. ‘Interpretation of Wittgenstein’s impact’ showing how his critique of theory, emphasis on use, and the notion of form of life destabilize classical metaphysical accounts of art.
3. ‘Analytical assessment of Wollheim’s ontology’—exploring how Wollheim transforms Wittgensteinian ideas into a framework where artworks are understood not through definitions but through possibilities, practices, and modes of recognition.
 
Discussion and Result
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy undermines the hope for a definitive theory of art by rejecting the idea that linguistic or conceptual categories possess a unified essence. His notion of ‘family resemblance’ suggests that what we call “art” consists of overlapping similarities rather than a single core property. More fundamentally, the idea of ‘form of life’ indicates that meaning emerges from human practices rather than from abstract metaphysical structures. These insights form the background for Wollheim’s aesthetic theory.
Wollheim argues that the persistent failure of philosophers to define art reveals not an intellectual shortcoming but a structural impossibility. Instead of asking ‘what art is?’, he suggests that philosophy should investigate how we ‘recognize’ something as art. Recognition, unlike definition, is sensitive to history, practice, and perceptual engagement. For Wollheim, artworks are neither pure physical objects nor purely mental events; they are intentional, historically embedded objects whose mode of existence is realized only through interpretation and perception.
Two major implications emerge from Wollheim’s adaptation of Wittgenstein. First, the artwork cannot be reduced to internal mental states (as in Croce or Collingwood), because artistic intention must be externally instantiated in a medium. Without such externalization, the artwork remains inchoate. Second, the artwork cannot be understood solely from the artist’s standpoint; the viewer’s informed perception is equally constitutive. Wollheim calls this perceptual engagement “seeing-in,” a concept that captures the interplay between the material object and the imaginative capacities of the observer.
Wollheim’s ontology thus becomes a theory of ‘open-ended possibilities’: artworks do not occupy a fixed ontological category but reside within a dynamic field shaped by cultural practices, historical conditions, and perceptual responses. This reflects Wittgenstein’s claim that ‘forms of life’ are not rigid structures but flowing patterns of human activity. As such, artworks belong to no strict essence; they are intelligible only through their participation in forms of life.
A key result of this analysis is that art cannot be governed by a universal rulebook similar to the grammar of language. While languages can exhibit ungrammaticality, art lacks an equivalent notion of “aesthetic incorrectness.” The boundaries of art are historically contingent and continually renegotiated. Thus, Wollheim’s view supports a historically sensitive aesthetic that rejects timeless categorical definitions.
 
Conclusion
The article concludes that Wollheim, drawing deeply from Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, provides a compelling alternative to essentialist ontology in aesthetics. By foregrounding recognition, practice, and historically shaped perceptual capacities, he reframes the question “What is art?” into an inquiry about how artworks acquire meaning within forms of life. Art, in this perspective, is neither a closed category nor a metaphysical kind; it is an open domain structured by possibilities rather than necessities. Wollheim’s synthesis preserves the philosophical rigor of analytic aesthetics while freeing it from the limitations of theory-building. Ultimately, the ontology of art he proposes clarifies that artworks exist not through fixed definitions but through the infinite possibilities generated by human practices, cultural contexts, and modes of seeing.

Abstract The Theory of Language Games is the key notion of Ludwig Wittgenstein's latter philosophy. This theory has been crafted against The Picture Theory of Language as the core of Wittgenstein’s Tractarian vision.
      According to The Picture Theory of Language, Language has merely one function: picturing reality. We can grasp the truth of World through grasping the truth of Language. Indeed, this latter theory is a representative of a Modern view of language. On the contrary, according to The Theory of Language Games, Language is a Multidimensional phenomenon; hence, we could never understand it from an Essentialist point of view. Indeed, Language consists of a body of different Language Games: Linguistic Functions. Each of such language games is connected with a special Form of Life. Thus conceived, understanding a language game essentially implies understanding the very Form of Life within which the language game occurs. The Theory of Language Games is a Postmodern Philosophical Standpoint of Language. And, in this article, our main goal is to analyze different aspects of this latter remark.