Reconstructing the Sociology of Art through Lukács’s Theory of the Novel: A Critical Reading of Western Modern Aesthetics"
Volume 16, Issue 2, February 2026, Pages 1-37
https://doi.org/10.30465/os.2026.52101.2062
Hossein Abbasi
Abstract Introduction
This article aims to reconstruct the sociology of art through Georg Lukács's theory of the novel and present a critical reading of modern Western aesthetics. The main issue is to explain how art, particularly the literary form of the novel, can be analyzed sociologically not merely as a passive reflection of social content, but as a phenomenon with autonomous aesthetic forms that are simultaneously intertwined with socio-historical conditions. Contrasting purely empirical or formalistic approaches, this research seeks to offer a model, based on Lukács's thought, where the artistic "form" is the site of convergence and crystallization of "social reality." Thus, Lukács's theory of the novel is introduced as a realized paradigm and a methodological model for the sociology of art.
Materials & Methods
This article is written using a descriptive-analytical method, focusing on documentary research and theoretical content analysis. The primary materials are the works of Georg Lukács in aesthetics, the theory of the novel, and the sociology of art, especially "The Theory of the Novel," "Soul and Form," "The Historical Novel," and "Studies in European Realism." To delineate Lukács's intellectual background, the aesthetic theories of Immanuel Kant and G.W.F. Hegel are referenced, and for comparison and expansion, the views of sociologists such as Émile Durkheim, Theodor Adorno, and Howard Becker are cited. The method involves extracting and analyzing key aesthetic components of the novel from Lukács's perspective (such as human development, closure, character, and realism) and demonstrating the dialectical connection of these components to the socio-historical conditions of the modern era.
Discussion & Result
The present study shows that Lukács, by adopting the concept of "totality" from the Hegelian tradition and linking it with a material-historical analysis, historicizes and socializes aesthetics. From his perspective, the novel, as the paradigmatic literary form of modernity, emerges not from the artist's subjectivity alone, but from specific socio-historical relations characterized by human "alienation" and the loss of meaning-giving totality in modern society. Four key aesthetic aspects in Lukács's theory of the novel are analyzed:
Human Development: The novel is the only artistic form capable of depicting the process of human becoming and development within time and in engagement with social structures.
Closure (terminus ad quem): The beauty of a work depends on providing a logical and necessary closure that convincingly concludes all narrative details and character development.
Character: The character in the novel is a social being who preserves and transforms their "core" through interaction and conflict with social obstacles and structures.
Realism: Lukács's realism is not a superficial description of details but a dialectical representation of the "relation between individual and society" and the presentation of the "totality of objects" within a coherent artistic form.
The key finding of the article is that by focusing on these aesthetic components and linking them to objective conditions, Lukács effectively provides a "methodological model" for the sociology of art. In this model, the artistic form is understood not as a cover for content, but as the most objectified level of manifestation of social reality. Therefore, a Lukács-inspired sociology of art is a study that traces and analyzes the presence of social structures within the very aesthetic formation of artworks.
Conclusion
This article argued that Georg Lukács's theory of the novel marks a turning point in the formation of the sociology of art in the precise sense. By synthesizing two intellectual traditions—namely, the formulation of "social fact" in Durkheimian sociology and the recognition of the "cognitive aspect" of art in Hegelian aesthetics—Lukács made possible the sociological analysis of artistic forms. His innovation was to show that a sociological analysis of art must focus on the form itself and its aesthetic components, not merely on the social themes or content of works. The theory of the novel serves as a concrete example, demonstrating how the form of the novel and components such as human development, characterization, and realism are directly rooted in the historical-social conditions of modernity (alienation, individualism, capitalist relations). Consequently, this research offers two practical suggestions: First, any future sociology of art research should focus on analyzing the connection between specific artistic forms and their relevant social reality. Second, Lukács's model can be applied to the sociological analysis of other artistic forms in different historical-cultural contexts (such as modern Persian poetry), provided that the inherent aesthetic aspects of that form are first extracted and then their connection to specific social conditions is demonstrated.
Is Bergson a Phenomenologist? The Given Absolute vs the Correlationalism
Volume 15, Issue 1, November 2024, Pages 187-214
https://doi.org/10.30465/os.2025.51197.2032
Seyed Ashkan Khatibi, Mohammad Taghi Tabatab’i
Abstract Intoduction
Considering Bergson's philosophy from the perspective of phenomenology, in order to compare and evaluate the latter, is a long-standing and seemingly justified approach. Indeed, in both thoughts, the duality between subject and object is transcended, the intuition of lived time occupies a central place, data are fundamental in themselves, and temporality constitutes the foundation of consciousness. However, this evaluation, carried out by three generations of phenomenologists (Roman Ingarden, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Renaud Barbaras), is based on the idea that Bergson's philosophy represents a kind of early — and, of course, unfinished — phenomenology. From this point of view, Bergson's philosophy is perceived as a version of realism that ultimately reduces consciousness to a thing. However, realists such as Quentin Meillassoux also consider Bergson's philosophy as a type of correlational thought, of the same nature as phenomenology. The common hypothesis among all these perspectives is that Bergson's philosophy presents a difference of degree compared to phenomenology. We strive to demonstrate the contrary: it differs in nature.
Materials and Methods
In discussing Bergson's philosophy as well as that of certain phenomenologists and realists, we focus on the sources and primary literature. From this point of view, we have taken into account the similarities and (false) identities at the level of technical terms and the lexical field of the two philosophies, as well as in the formulations and statements of the problems and positions. However, upon closer examination, we attempt to dissect the profound difference in substance, despite the striking similarity in form. Our method, as far as one can speak of it in this context, consists of highlighting the differences in the false mixtures, rather than seeking unity beyond multiplicity. It is evident that this approach is inspired, in its generality and orientation, by Bergson's own philosophy.
Discussion & Results
The main contribution of this article is to defend the idea that Bergson's philosophy, based on the notion of the given absolute, simultaneously surpasses correlational thoughts such as phenomenology and different forms of realism. On one hand, the absoluteness of Bergson's duration establishes a clear distinction between Bergson's philosophy and any philosophy that thinks under the universal a priori of correlation. On the other hand, the Bergsonian réel to which consciousness refers is only the moving, which differs in nature from a reified conception of the real: the thing, in Bergson's eyes, is merely an abstraction of the flow of the real, of the real as duration. Hence, the impossibility of considering Bergson's thought as a regrettable return to the reified conception of the real. In result, realists are not justified to consider Bergson's thought as a version of correlationalism, neither phenomenologists are allowed to designate it as a disguised realism.
Conclusion
Bergson's philosophy is not limited to a simple difference of degree with phenomenology, but presents a difference of nature. Therefore, despite appearances, there is a profound divergence between the notions and fundamental conceptions of the two. The Bergsonian given absolute is exempted to be received or to be given to a certain consciousness. Consequently, the meaning of donation in Bergson's philosophy fundamentally differs from that proposed in phenomenology. In Bergson's philosophy, the donation consists of a continuous differentiation of duration, and consciousness itself is merely the product of one of its movements of differentiation. In contrast, donation, according to the understanding of the three phenomenologists mentioned earlier, stemming from Husserlian phenomenology, is the establishment of a correlational relationship between the given and the receiver. From this perspective, while for Husserl's phenomenology consciousness is always the consciousness of something, for Bergson's philosophy, thinking intuitively amounts to thinking in duration. In the same vein, the responses of these two philosophies to the question of experience are also different: one transforms transcendence into immanence, while the other transforms self-consciousness into consciousness of the other. The basis of this difference lies in the two distinct ontologies and logics that underlie each of these philosophies. The logic of phenomenology is based on the fundamental principle of correlation, while the logic of Bergson's philosophy is that of expression. What underpins Bergson's philosophy, namely duration as the given absolute, cannot be discussed either in correlational thoughts such as phenomenology or in the different versions of realism. It is irreducibly Bergsonian.
