Introduction
The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were a period of fundamental transformation in the relationship between theology and philosophy. In England during this era, traditional Christian theology sought to present faith as a rational system, consistent with logical necessities. In contrast, a skeptical and naturalistic tradition was emerging, with figures such as Thomas Hobbes representing its most prominent voices. Hobbes, through teachings such as materialism, moral relativism, and the denial of natural religion, paved the way for new approaches to religion, while simultaneously provoking the anger of ecclesiastical authorities.
David Hume grew up in this intellectual environment and developed his philosophy both in continuation of, and in critical response to, the rationalist and natural theological traditions. Drawing inspiration from Locke, Berkeley, and Hobbes, Hume established his radical empiricism and, by analyzing concepts such as causation, substance, the self, and God, demonstrated that much of traditional theological doctrine lacked a solid epistemic foundation.
In reaction to this approach, early critics labeled Hume an atheist, skeptic, and destroyer of religion. However, interpreters such as Ernest Mossner, Kemp Smith, Passmore, Gaskin, and Paul Russell in later centuries have shown that Hume’s skepticism had a constructive dimension, and that his aim was not the negation of religion but rather the clarification of the limits of human knowledge.
Nonetheless, a fundamental question remains: what was Hume’s actual stance regarding God and religion? Should he be considered an atheist or an agnostic? This article argues that both characterizations are inadequate, and that the most accurate description of Hume’s position is God indifference. In this view, the question of God is not a central issue, but rather a topic outside the core domain of human epistemology and ethics.
The term God-indifference in this article is neither equivalent to Apatheism nor to theological Indifferentism; rather, it is an interpretive term proposed to accurately represent Hume’s perspective on religion. In this sense, Hume is neither a denier nor a defender of God; instead, by focusing on human psychology and ethics, he removes the question of God from the center of philosophy and reinterprets religion in light of human experience.
Materials & Methods
This research employs a conceptual-hermeneutical method grounded in historical-philosophical analysis. The study integrates three levels of investigation:

Textual Analysis: A close reading of Hume’s primary works—A Treatise of Human Nature, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, and The Natural History of Religion—to identify his treatment of divine and religious themes.
Contextual Interpretation: Examination of the intellectual and theological milieu of early modern Britain, including responses to Hobbes, Clarke, Butler, and other figures of natural theology.
Conceptual Reconstruction: Introduction of the term God-indifference as an interpretive tool to describe Hume’s stance toward the divine, distinguishing it from related notions such as indifferentism (a theological neutrality) and apatheism (a psychological or practical indifference).

The methodology of this research combines historical and philosophical analysis, aiming to reconstruct the structure of Hume’s thought and to determine the place of his philosophy in the development of modern philosophy of religion.
Discussion & Results
The analysis reveals that Hume’s position cannot be adequately captured by the dichotomy of belief and disbelief. In Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, while Hume’s characters debate the teleological and cosmological arguments, none provides a conclusive proof of divine existence. Even the possibility of a “supreme cause” is left as a mere hypothesis, lacking moral or existential significance. Hume thus neither affirms nor refutes God’s existence; he simply regards the question as lacking epistemic value.
Similarly, in A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume dismantles metaphysical concepts—such as causality, substance, and the self—that traditionally underpinned natural theology. His critique of causation, for instance, undermines the logical structure of the cosmological argument. If causal inference rests merely on habit and not on rational necessity, then no argument from the world’s order can lead to a necessary divine cause.
Moreover, Hume’s moral philosophy reinforces this perspective. By grounding morality in sentiment rather than divine command, he redefines the basis of ethics as natural, psychological, and social. Religion, in this view, is a byproduct of human imagination and emotional need, not an outcome of rational proof.
This interpretive shift culminates in what the present study calls God-indifference a philosophical posture that neither rejects nor affirms divinity but de-centers it. Unlike apatheism, which denotes emotional or practical unconcern about God, Hume’s God indifference is epistemic and philosophical: the belief that the question of God’s existence simply does not matter for human knowledge, ethics, or happiness.
Such an interpretation clarifies why labeling Hume as an atheist or agnostic is misleading. The atheist seeks to deny God; the agnostic withholds belief but continues to treat the issue as central; Hume, by contrast, shifts the axis of philosophy altogether—from divine ontology to human experience. Religion thus becomes, for Hume, an object of empirical and psychological inquiry rather than a domain of metaphysical speculation.
This reading also explains the constructive side of Hume’s skepticism. His purpose was not to destroy belief but to redefine its limits, showing that meaning, morality, and social order can arise independently of theological foundations. Consequently, Hume’s philosophy paves the way for a new, human-centered philosophy of religion—one that interprets faith as an expression of emotion, imagination, and the search for meaning rather than as a system of proofs about divine reality.
Conclusion
In light of this analysis, Hume’s religious philosophy should be understood as a form of God-indifference—a reflective detachment from metaphysical claims about God that reorients philosophical inquiry toward human life and experience. He does not advocate atheism, which would still involve a kind of metaphysical commitment to the nonexistence of God, nor does he adopt agnosticism, which continues to treat the divine question as an unsolved problem. Instead, Hume marginalizes the entire issue, regarding it as secondary to the study of human nature, sentiment, and morality.
This stance has profound implications for modern philosophy of religion. It challenges the assumption that religious thought must center on belief in a deity and opens the door to a non-theistic but meaning-oriented understanding of faith. Hume’s philosophy thus anticipates later existential and humanistic trends that interpret religion as a function of human emotional and moral life rather than as metaphysical speculation.
Ultimately, God-indifference encapsulates Hume’s enduring legacy: a redefinition of the relationship between philosophy, religion, and human experience. In his framework, the divine ceases to be the axis of intellectual inquiry, and human nature—its perceptions, passions, and search for meaning—takes center stage. This transformation marks a pivotal moment in the history of Western thought, moving from the theology of being to the philosophy of living, from metaphysical proofs to existential understanding, and from the question of God to the reality of humanity.