a  critique of Dasgupta's normative argument against moral non-naturalism

Lotfi, Marziye

doi:10.30465/os.2023.36689.1725

Document Type : Research Paper

Author

Marziye Lotfi

Ph.D. in Philosophy, Fundamental Knowledge Research Institute

10.30465/os.2023.36689.1725

Abstract

According to moral non-naturalism, moral notions like “goodness” are sui generis. They are not reducible to any natural or metaphysical notions. One of the pivotal arguments raised against the view is the normative argument. The main idea is that these sui generis properties would have no “normative authority” over us. In this paper, I will consider an external construal of the argument developed by Dasgupta. Dasgupta, in his external normative argument, grants for the sake of argument that there is a sui generis property P. However, he holds that there is still the unanswered question: Why the sui generis property P should be promoted? He claims that there is no answer to this question; hence P, if there is such a property, cannot be the property “goodness”. In this paper, I will examine the argument at length. I will try to clarify that the argument is based on the wrong supposition.

Keywords

References

References

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Occidental Studies

a critique of Dasgupta's normative argument against moral non-naturalism

References

References

Volume 13, Issue 2 - Serial Number 26
February 2023
Pages 75-91

a critique of Dasgupta's normative argument against moral non-naturalism

References

References

Volume 13, Issue 2 - Serial Number 26February 2023Pages 75-91

Volume 13, Issue 2 - Serial Number 26
February 2023
Pages 75-91