Existential Analysis of the Call of Conscience in the Thought of Martin Heidegger By Studying the Book Being and Time

Introduction
 
In the context of twentieth-century existential phenomenology, Martin Heidegger's concept of conscience (Gewissen) in Being and Time offers a radical departure from both theological and Kantian moral traditions. Instead of understanding conscience as a faculty of moral judgment or as the voice of divine command, Heidegger conceives it as a silent existential call a call that disrupts Dasein's immersion in the everyday and recalls it to the possibility of authentic existence. In his fundamental ontology, conscience does not provide moral content or guidance, but rather initiates a transformation in how Dasein relates to its own being. This paper aims to examine this existential structure of conscience, analyze its ontological roots, and distinguish it from conventional ethical and religious interpretations.
 
 
 
Materials & Methods
 
This research employs a hermeneutic-phenomenological method in analyzing Heidegger’s Being and Time, with a particular focus on sections §§54–60, where the theme of conscience is explicitly articulated. The study interprets key Heideggerian categories such as fallenness (Verfallen), resoluteness (Entschlossenheit), thrownness (Geworfenheit), and authenticity (Eigentlichkeit) to situate the phenomenon of conscience within the ontological analytic of Dasein.
In addition to a close reading of the original German and English translations of Heidegger’s text, this paper also critically examines contemporary commentaries from Hubert Dreyfus, Charles Guignon, and Richard Capobianco to highlight the diversity of interpretations concerning the ontological or moral status of conscience. Sources from both primary literature and secondary scholarship in English and Persian have been used to ensure conceptual clarity and cross-traditional relevance.
 
Discussion & Result
 
Heidegger’s analysis reveals that conscience is not a normative faculty but an existential event that discloses Dasein’s thrownness and urges it toward resolute existence. The “call” of conscience is characterized by its silenceit “says” nothing, issues no command, and offers no judgment. Instead, it interrupts Dasein's absorption in the public world of “Das Man” and exposes the inauthenticity of conformist life. As Heidegger asserts, “What conscience calls us to is not any particular action, but simply our ownmost potentiality-for-being-guilty”.
This call, however, is not to be conflated with guilt in the moral sense. It is an ontological guilt arising from the finitude and facticity of existence. Dasein is guilty not because of moral transgressions, but because it always already lives amidst neglected possibilities. Responding to this call requires resoluteness, a stance in which Dasein fully owns its thrown condition and assumes its existential responsibility without recourse to moral universals.
In contrast to the Kantian understanding, where conscience is bound to the authority of the categorical imperative, Heidegger’s conscience lacks content and normativity. While Kant sees conscience as rational self-legislation, Heidegger redefines it as a disclosure of being. The ethical implication here is profound: it shifts the foundation of responsibility from universal law to the individual’s authentic relation to being.
 
Among interpreters, Dreyfus maintains that Heidegger's conscience is radically non-moral and even anti-ethical. For him, the call merely disrupts, without guiding, and thus reveals no concrete direction for action. Guignon on the other hand, detects within Heidegger's existential framework a form of implied moralitya responsibility to self and possibly to others grounded in authenticity rather than moral norms. Capobianco presents a metaphysical reading, asserting that the call of conscience represents Being’s way of disclosing itself through Dasein, emphasizing not personal ethics but ontological receptivity.
 
This paper argues that while Heidegger deliberately avoids moral language, conscience nonetheless initiates a space where responsibility is made possible—not as a set of duties, but as the existential necessity of owning one’s being. The call does not dictate, but opens; it is a call to respond, not a rule to obey.
 
Conclusion
 
The existential analysis of conscience in Being and Time reveals a profound transformation in the understanding of responsibility, guilt, and moral agency. Conscience, as Heidegger presents it, is neither theological nor rational in the traditional sense. It is a pre-ethical phenomenon that enables authentic decision-making by confronting Dasein with its own thrownness and finitude. The “silent voice” of conscience strips away the chatter of the everyday, enabling the self to hear the quiet urgency of its ownmost being.
 
This research shows that Heidegger’s notion of conscience, while free from moral prescriptivism, lays the groundwork for a new understanding of responsibility grounded in ontological freedom. It challenges us to rethink conscience not as the judge of actions, but as the silent harbinger of authenticity. In doing so, it opens the way for an existential ethics—not rooted in laws or norms, but in the courage to listen to one’s being and choose resolutely.