Occidental Studies

Abstract Introduction
If we consider “the modern" as a phenomenon without a single focus, then we can talk about different types of the modern and, as a result, discuss the "transformation" of the modern. However, if we consider the modern as a single totality that has a single focus, then we can no longer talk about transformation in the modern because the assumption of the "uniqueness" of the modern is in conflict with talking about its transformation; this is exactly the point in which “Metamorphosis” becomes the main category for explaining transformation in the modern. Metamorphosis is a term that has entered the humanities from the empirical sciences and refers to the stages of development of an organism. Therefore, talking about Gestalt Metamorphosis in the modern is primarily about accepting the hypothesis that the modern has a single totality and that its internal Metamorphosis cannot be considered in the sense of ontological breaks. Of course, this Metamorphosis is accompanied by important epistemological breaks. This article shows that in the context of the new-coming Western civilization, we are witnessing the emergence of a new gestalt of the modern, which can be explained within the framework of “reflexive modernity.” Today, it is this reflexive modernity that has created and established a completely distinct gestalt of the modern.
  
Materials and Methods                        
The article recruits the Gestalt theory as its main approach to comprehend metamorphosis in the modern. Gestalt theory connotates a perception that emphasises the processing of entire patterns and configurations, and not merely individual components. However, the Gestalt approach has been used less in sociological fields. While this approach is based on principles that can determine the trajectory of social research and provide a new context for their explanation. For this reason, the present article attempts to explain the process of transformation in the "modern" by using the Gestalt approach and show how the modern has undergone a kind of metamorphosis in the context of the new-coming Western civilization and, as a result, the modern subject has found a different perception of modernity. In order to apply this theoretical approach, we must first understand its fundamental principles. therefore, we briefly explain those principles that play a role in explaining the Gestalt transformation of the modern.
 
Discussion and Result
The economic gestalt of modernity was accompanied by the emergence of a structure called “Society” that emerged as a result of the dissolution of “communities”. Therefore, Western civilization in the period of mid-modernity can be considered a “social civilization.” However, the collapse of this gestalt and the emergence of the reflexive gestalt of modernity were in turn accompanied by a metamorphosis in the civilizational dimension. Today, it can be said with certainty that the newly emerging Western civilization is emptying itself of its “social aspect.” In this midst, we are witnessing the emergence of an “individual-oriented civilization” that has the same essential power as the previous “social civilization.” In fact, reflexive modernity is concerned with the emergence of a new individuality that transforms the social sphere of modernity into an individual-oriented sphere and replaces a subjective perspective with a structured perspective, thus transforming all social relations radically.
 
Conclusion
According to the main hypothesis of this article, the Gestalt metamorphosis of the modern and the emergence of a reflexive modernity occur in the context of a new civilization; a civilization that can be called an “individual-oriented civilization” and distinguished from a “social civilization.” In order to examine this hypothesis, we used the Gestalt approach of perception and based our analysis on a number of key principles of this approach.
According to the principle of “field-form,” which can be explained on the basis of the “pregnancy” mechanism, the individual-oriented Western civilization has become a field in which the form of the modern is perceived. Since this individual-oriented civilization is strongly modernist, it has caused the sphere of influence of the modernist Gestalt dimension of the modern to expand and thus bring the foundations of modernity under its umbrella. This in itself also brings with it a kind of Gestalt metamorphosis in the modern; a metamorphosis that can be explained in its final stage on the basis of the principle of overshadowing.
As we have already mentioned, this principle states that a visual structure as a whole may be composed of a number of smaller gestalts, but the larger gestalt, because it has a stronger prefiguration, ultimately determines the meaning of the smaller gestalts. Thus, with the expansion of the sphere of influence of modernism, the meaning of modernity has been overshadowed, and as a result, the totality of the gestalt of the modern has undergone a metamorphosis; a metamorphosis that concerns both the positive and the negative aspects. Radical Individualization can be a symbol of the negative aspect, and  moderate individuation is a symbol of the positive aspect of this metamorphosis. Radical Individualization reduces the individual to a living being and empties him of content. The individualized individual is only a spectator consumer or a traditional imitator. He is either a slave of dictators or a tool in the hands of the markets. Such an individual is like a termite that eats and rots the tree of modernity from within. Totalitarian governments and unbridled capitalism are two great factories for the production of Radical individualism which alone can implode the order of reflexive modernity.
 
 

Abstract Abstract 3
 Islamophobic sentiments, linking them to security concerns, migration issues, and cultural differences. By identifying recurring patterns in historical narratives, this study provides insights into the mechanisms through which Islamophobia persists in contemporary societies.
Addressing Islamophobia requires a critical reassessment of historical Christian-Muslim relations and a more nuanced understanding of religious and political interactions. The study underscores the importance of interfaith dialogue, education, and media literacy in challenging Islamophobic narratives. By fostering a more balanced and informed perspective on Islam, it is possible to counter misconceptions and promote mutual understanding between religious communities. Ultimately, this research contributes to ongoing efforts to combat Islamophobia by highlighting the significance of historical awareness and cross-cultural engagement in shaping more inclusive societies.
Discussion and conclusion
This study explores the historical roots of Christian fear of Islam, shaped by the "geometry of faith and power," which influenced religious, political, and social interactions. Key factors include the absence of a true leader after the Prophet Muhammad, misinterpretations of jihad, "othering" through dividing the world into Dar al-Harb and Dar al-Islam, and material motivations behind conquests. These dynamics led to Islamic expansionism, confiscation of Christian lands, and retaliatory actions like the Crusades. Restrictive laws for non-Muslims, such as the jizya tax and forced conversions, further strained relations. While periods of tolerance existed, they were conditional and often influenced by political or economic factors. Misinterpretations of Quranic teachings, particularly jihad, contributed to both historical conflicts and modern Islamophobia. Addressing these issues requires critical reflection and revisiting religious interpretations, raising the question: Who truly represents Islam?

Abstract Introduction
The Cartesian subject and Kant’s transcendental perception are considered the foundations of modern epistemology. The evolution of the concept of the subject from Descartes to Hegel shows its deep connection with modernity. Modern thought largely defines itself in relation to the idea of the subject, either by reaffirming or criticizing it. Initially, philosophers like Descartes and Kant viewed the subject as an independent consciousness that perceives the object. Descartes saw the subject as central and superior to the object, while Kant emphasized the subject's inherent awareness. In contrast, thinkers like Hume, Marx, and Foucault challenged the primacy of the subject. Hume denied the unity of the mind; Locke stressed objective reality independent of perception; Marx described the subject’s alienation under capitalism; and Nietzsche reinterpreted subjectivity through power relations. Philosophers like Vico and Herder offered a middle path, emphasizing historical knowledge and evolving reason. Hegel introduced self-consciousness, suggesting that awareness of objects must accompany self-awareness. Heidegger critiqued the Cartesian-Kantian notion of a transcendental subject, arguing it perpetuated metaphysical subjectivism. Foucault extended Heidegger’s critique by analyzing subjectivity through power, knowledge, and discourse, showing that resistance and subjugation are intertwined. Through history, philosophers treated the subject as a crucial concept. Heidegger and Foucault, in particular, examined how technology and discourse shape and control subjectivity. This study compares their views to clarify the evolution of the subject.
 
Materials & Methods
This research first gathers information from books and articles on Heidegger and Foucault, then compares their views. Heidegger criticizes Cartesian philosophy, particularly its subject-object separation, which he believes leads to a mechanical and technological view of the world. Instead, he emphasizes Dasein — the being-in-the-world — highlighting the intertwined relationship between humans and their environment. Heidegger rejects both realism and idealism, proposing a phenomenological approach that seeks to understand lived human experience directly, beyond abstract metaphysical frameworks.
Through Dasein, Heidegger portrays existence as dynamic and interpretive, not a static self-awareness. Human beings are always already embedded in a historical and cultural context, shaping and interpreting the world around them. Heidegger’s critique extends to epistemology; he challenges Kantian and Cartesian models, arguing that true knowledge stems from a primordial understanding of being, not abstract logic.
In discussing technology, Heidegger warns that it reduces beings to mere resources, concealing their true essence. However, he does not simply oppose technology; he calls for a deeper understanding of its essence, Ge-stell (enframing), where existence reveals itself through technological thinking. Heidegger stresses that Being itself resists human domination; existence cannot be fully controlled through will or technology.
Overall, Heidegger’s notion of subjectivity dismantles the Cartesian dualism of subject and object, proposing instead a dynamic, relational view of human existence deeply intertwined with Being and world.
Foucault, on the other hand, explores how modern power structures shape and produce subjects. He defines the subject in two ways: as one subjected to external control, and as one who forms an identity through self-awareness. Both involve forms of subjugation under pervasive systems of power.
Foucault emphasizes that power operates not just in formal institutions but permeates every layer of society through political technologies. These mechanisms not only create social hierarchies but also turn individuals into objects of knowledge and control. In modernity, despite appearing autonomous, subjects are deeply embedded within systems of surveillance, discipline, and normalization.
The body becomes a key site for the exercise of power: monitored, disciplined, and rendered an object of study. Foucault argues that individuals are shaped, rather than self-formed, by these systems, undermining the notion of autonomous subjectivity.
Both thinkers critically examine how modernity affects the concept of the subject. Heidegger focuses on the metaphysical and existential dimensions, while Foucault highlights the socio-political and disciplinary mechanisms that constitute human beings in modern societies.
 
Discussion & Result
This research explores and compares Heidegger's and Foucault’s perspectives on subjectivity and modernity. Heidegger criticizes Cartesian philosophy for its separation of subject and object, arguing that it leads to a mechanical understanding of reality. Instead, he proposes the concept of Dasein — being-in-the-world — emphasizing the interconnectedness of humans and their environment. Rejecting both realism and idealism, Heidegger advances a phenomenological approach centered on direct, lived experience.
Through Dasein, Heidegger portrays human existence as historically and culturally embedded rather than simply self-aware. He also challenges traditional epistemology, asserting that authentic knowledge arises from a primordial grasp of Being, not from abstract reasoning. Regarding technology, Heidegger warns that technological thinking reduces all entities to mere resources, hiding their true essence. His concept of Ge-stell (enframing) explains how technology frames and organizes our perception of existence, though he maintains that Being itself ultimately resists human domination. Heidegger redefines subjectivity as dynamic and relational, opposing Cartesian dualism.
In contrast, Foucault examines how modern power structures produce and control subjects. He sees the subject both as externally dominated and as self-formed through internalized practices shaped by power. Power, according to Foucault, operates beyond formal institutions, penetrating everyday life through political technologies that create social norms and systems of surveillance and discipline. The body becomes a key site for exercising control, illustrating how individuals are molded by external forces rather than being fully autonomous.
Both thinkers critique modernity’s impact on the human condition — Heidegger through an existential lens and Foucault through socio-political analysis.
 
Conclusion
Michel Foucault and Martin Heidegger both examined subjects like power, technology, and the modern condition, though with different approaches. Heidegger viewed technology ontologically, seeing it as a force that turns nature and humans into exploitable resources, alienating humanity from true Being. He warned against the "Enframing" mindset and called for a return to reflective, poetic ways of engaging with existence. In contrast, Foucault saw technology as practices and discourses linked to power, operating within institutions like prisons and hospitals. He highlighted "technologies of the self," through which individuals could shape their identities and resist dominant powers. Foucault argued that power is both repressive and productive, always offering possibilities for resistance. Together, their views offer a deep critique of modernity and suggest different strategies for confronting technological domination.

Abstract Introduction
Hannah Arendt, prior to Foucault and Agamben, addressed biopolitics in her works without explicitly using the term. In The Origins of Totalitarianism and The Human Condition, she analyzes statelessness and the decline of the public realm, phenomena that lead to the erasure of human action and the reduction of the human being to mere biological existence. In contrast to Agamben’s life-denying conception of biopolitics, Arendt proposes the possibility of a life-affirming biopolitics through the concept of “natality.” Accordingly, framing Arendt’s political theory from the perspective of biopolitics not only deepens our understanding of her critique of death-bound modern power, but also highlights her reflections on a life-affirming biopolitics as a path toward liberation from the deadly logic of modernity, as seen in Auschwitz and the Gulags. This article, therefore, defines and contrasts both life-denying and life-affirming biopolitics and situates Arendt’s thought within these two strands. To clarify her position, the concepts of zoē, bios, and natality are first examined in their ontological interrelations, followed by an explanation of how they correspond to the various forms of human activity; namely labor, work and action.
Materials and Methods
Biopolitics emerges as an interdisciplinary field centered around the nature/society dualism, not to indicate a conflict between the two, but their interaction. Jean-Luc Nancy views biopolitics as a political order shaped by biological sciences, aiming to manage, surveil, and dominate individuals' lives. Biopolitics is not a side concern, but a form of politics where biological and social lives are intertwined. Here, life shapes politics, and politics shapes life. Biopolitics can be seen as a system of strategies connecting the human and natural sciences, directing population behavior, reproduction, and social ways of life integrated with biology. This creates a new break in governance practices, where political and biological spheres intersect, making life the focus of biopolitical interventions. Foucault highlights how biopolitics led to technologies of power centered on human biological processes, influencing not only biological management but also population organization within monitorable social structures. Roberto Esposito extends the concept by distinguishing between "life-affirming" biopolitics, which seeks to protect life, and "life-denying" biopolitics, seen in totalitarian regimes like Stalin's and Hitler's.
Discussion
In The Human Condition, Arendt identifies three fundamental human activities: labor, work, and action. Labor is tied to biological survival and the natural cycle of zoē; work is concerned with the fabrication of durable objects; and action, which corresponds to Aristotelian praxis, is linked to freedom, the appearance of the individual among others, and bios. Unlike labor and work, action is initiatory and capable of bringing about a new order. For Arendt, human natality is the basis of our capacity to begin anew and the condition of the possibility of political freedom. In Arendt’s thought, natality is a fundamental concept that opens the path to liberation from the monotony of biological life (zoē) and even the repetitiveness of social life (bios). Natality refers to the human capacity to initiate something new, an inherent potential that comes into the world with birth. Contrary to common assumptions, this potential does not emerge in separation from nature but rather in a creative engagement with it. Arendt develops this concept through her reading of Augustine, as well as Heidegger’s notion of thrownness. Just as Heidegger’s Dasein is a being thrown into the world without consent but still tasked with giving meaning to its existence, Arendt’s natality indicates that although humans are born into pre-given circumstances, they always retain the possibility of a new beginning. Thus, natality forms a bridge between zoē and bios: it emerges from biological life, yet through spontaneity and action, it transforms social and political existence. For Arendt, if a redemptive form of biopolitics is possible, it lies precisely where natality functions as the politicization of zoē, rather than the mere repetition of bios.
Conclusion
A biopolitical reading of Arendt’s thought clarifies that she theorized both of its strands, life-denying and life-affirming biopolitics. In The Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt offers a sociohistorical analysis that exemplifies thanato-politics, where human beings are reduced to mere biological life. In The Human Condition, she presents an ontological approach to human activity by distinguishing between labor, work, and action, and linking the Aristotelian concepts of zoē and bios to biological and political life. Within this framework, “natality”, the capacity to begin anew, becomes a central concept: the foundation of freedom and human action. Arendt blends Heideggerian ontology with political philosophy to define natality as a fundamental trait of the acting human being, a capacity that bridges the realms of life and politics. From this perspective, freedom is not a goal but the very existential condition of being human in the world. Natality, as a liberating force, not only prevents the reduction of political life to bare life but also enables a vitalist synthesis of bios and zoē. In Arendt’s view, political life is the arena in which human spontaneity manifests through collective action.

Abstract Introduction,
Deconstructive concepts have been transferred to architecture through the dominance of written form. In other cases, these concepts have been indirectly adapted and reconfigured within architectural practice, shedding their original verbal and textual functions. This means that the transmission of deconstructive ideas into architecture has not been literal or direct; rather, some concepts have been modified or renamed to better suit architectural contexts. Moreover, deconstructivist architects were not committed to all aspects of deconstruction. Instead, they focused on one or two key concepts and adapted them according to the foundational principles of their personal architectural styles. For example, Peter Eisenman emphasized notions such as presence, sign, paradox, and the emergence of the interior. Daniel Libeskind focused on absence, while Frank Gehry explored binary oppositions and the sources of representation.
In this regard, the multifaceted relationship between deconstructive philosophy and architecture offers an opportunity to rethink structure, construction, and tradition within the discipline. This is particularly relevant because of the parallels between the two in terms of structure, form, and historical continuity. This research investigates the various modes of interaction between the philosophical movement of deconstruction and architecture. To achieve this, the study poses the following central questions: – How and to what extent are deconstruction and architecture interconnected? – Which elements of deconstruction are applicable to architectural practice? – How, and based on which concepts or themes from deconstructive philosophy, can traditional architectural models be reinterpreted? The study is based on the hypothesis that this approach, by challenging traditional models, structures, and constructions, enables a deeper understanding of architectural content and form.
 
 
Material and Methods
This article adopts a theoretical-analytical approach, drawing upon the philosophical concepts of Heidegger and Derrida, to critically examine the intersection between deconstruction theory and architecture. It aims to demonstrate how the principles of deconstruction can challenge and reinterpret traditional notions of form, structure, and function.This study, using an analytical-interpretive method and based on documentary sources, examines the relationship between philosophy and architecture with a focus on the deconstructive elements in Eisenman’s works, and by presenting an analytical model, analyzes the application of these concepts in the façades of Iranian-Islamic schools and proposes design suggestions.
Discussion and Result
In the philosophical thought of Martin Heideger, the concept of the “house” becomes a fundamental site for human dwelling within Being. Heidegger introduces language as the “house of Being” suggesting that true building is not merely the act of erecting physical structures, but rather an manifestation of authentic dwelling in the world. For Heidegger, dwelling precedes building; it is through language and being that humanity inhabits the world.
However, Jacques Derrida, through a critical reading of Heidegger, argues that despite Heidegger’s efforts to break from the metaphysical tradition, he remains within its structures. Derrida, with his theory of deconstruction, seeks to dismantle the established foundations of the philosophy of presence, introducing concepts such as différance, deferral, and trace into philosophical discourse. In this approach, meaning is never fixed or final; it remains perpetually suspended and deferred. Presence is never complete or absolute but always intertwind with absence and traces of the past.
These philosophical developments have significantly influenced the field of architecture as well. Just as deconstruction disrupts stabilized meanings in philosophy, it challenges the unity of form, certainty of structure, and clarity of function in architecture. Derrida’s notion of presence as always already marked by absence finds resonance in architecture, where invisible traces reshape our experience of space and time. This logic is particularly evident in the works of architects such as Peter Eisenman. Projects like the Waxner Center for the Arts and Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe embody principles of fragmentation, suspension, and instability, redefining architectural identity through disruption and dislocation.
In this context, linking Iranian architecture with deconstruction theory provides an apportunity for critical rethinking of traditional concepts. Iranian architecture, historically grounded in geometric coherence, spatial hierarchies, and symbolic functionality, when engaged with deconstruction, moves toward fragmentation, multiplicity, and ambiguity. Fragmented forms, asymmetrical compositions, the use of unconventional materials, and the deliberate subversion of conventional expectations become hallmarks of this approach, generating fluid and multulayered spatial experience. One specific domain where this fusion proves particularly transformative is the design of educational spaces. Traditionally, schools have been conceived as highly stryctured, orderly, and conservative environments. Under a deconstructive lens, however, they transform into open, dynamic, and interactive spaces. Instead of rigid compartmentalization and linear pathways, there emerges a natural, flowing connection between interior and exterior, an abundant presence of natural light, and movment pathways characterized by nonlinearity, ambiguity, and multiplicity.
Moreover, the facades of schools designed under deconstructive principles break away from symmetry and simplicity. Irregular forms, fractured surfaces, and the application of unconventional materials such as raw concrete, layered glass, or broken bricks create new visual and semantic challenges.These architectural experssions destabilize perception, inviting users to rethink traditional structures and experience space as an open-ended, evolving phenomenon.
In this trajectory, the concept of “trace”, central to Derrida’s deconstruction, acquires special significance. The trace—representing the absent presence of the past—can serve as a subtle yet powerful guide for reinterpreting Iranian architectural heritage. Educational spaces inspired by deconstruction can maintain a latent connection to history without resorting to direct imitation, embodying a suspended dialogue between the past and the future. Thus, architecture becomes neither a mere replication of tradition nor a complete severance from it, but an ongoing negotiation across temporal boundaries.
Conclusion
Ultimately, deconstruction does not signify the destruction of tradition, but rather the opening of hidden layers of meaning. It represents a process through which both architecture and philosophy move away from fixed representations toward experience that are open, multilayered, and dynamic. In this view, the fusion of Iranian architecture with deconstruction not only challenges conventional boundaries of form, function, and structure but also creates spaces for continual dwelling, experiencing, and rethinking.
From this perspective, the synthesis of Iranian architecture and deconstruction theory offers a potential starting point for creating works that exist on the thresholds between past and future, stability and instability, meaning and ambiguity. These architectural experiences remain perpetually open, unfinished, and in a state of becoming— inviting occupants not merely to inhabit space, but to engage with it critically and creatively.
 

Abstract Introduction
Research from psychology, archaeology, and evolution suggests that most prehistoric human societies were relatively egalitarian. However, the arrival of nomadic invaders, who conquered early agricultural cultures in Europe and the ancient Near East, appears to have established a male hierarchy. Since then, the history of human society has been marked by the appropriation of women and girls. This includes abduction, assault, and rape by men, ranging from victors of wars to close relatives, the legal trading of women as slaves, forced marriages, the selling of young girls, the deprivation of women’s capital and social rights, and the imprisonment or killing of learned or rebellious women. Additionally, any attempts by women to achieve their rightful rights and social status have often been suppressed. This oppressive structure has been reinforced over millennia by art, literature, philosophy, history, customary laws, mythology, and religions.
In the twentieth century, scientific achievements and egalitarian movements have successfully challenged much of this old dogma, at least in developed societies, leading to the establishment of anti-misogynistic laws as the norm. However, in many countries, women still suffer from domestic violence, assault, rape, traditional customs, forced marriages, child marriages, honor killings, and human trafficking.
 
Material & Methods
This article is a descriptive-analytical case study that utilizes qualitative data collected through documentary methods. The primary aim of this research is to explore the symbolic layers embedded in the visual practices of Birgit Jürgenssen, a contemporary Austrian artist. Many of her works critique the objectification of women by the patriarchal system prevalent in human culture. To better understand the social context surrounding her and to grasp the attitudes, beliefs, and motivations that inform her work, we will first analyze this concept and trace the historical background of related issues. Following this, several of her works - including paintings, photographs, installations, and body art - will be examined and interpreted, using purposive sampling (criterion-based selection). The selected examples aim to narrate and challenge the ways in which women are objectified.
 
Discussion of Results
Mass media, advertising, and the television and film industries constantly emphasize the aesthetic evaluation of women's bodies, promoting objectification. To sell more goods and services, these media often present stereotypical forms of beauty, instilling the idea that anyone who does not conform to these artificial standards is somehow deficient. Such advertisements can lead individuals to feel inadequate about their bodies, creating a perceived need to purchase the promoted products.
When women attempt to conform to these standards of the "perfect woman," which are largely defined through the male gaze, self-objectification occurs. Over time, women may internalize the external perceptions of others regarding their bodies, viewing themselves primarily through this lens, ultimately seeing their bodies as separate objects rather than as an integral part of who they are.
Historically, one of the most pervasive methods of objectification in art has been the portrayal of women as objects for male enjoyment. This trend is evident across the visual arts of various cultures, particularly in European painting. Birgit Jürgenssen, a renowned Austrian artist and a key figure in feminist art during the 20th century, served as a professor at the University of Applied Arts Vienna and the Academy of Fine Arts Vienna. She began her artistic career in the 1970s, a time when women faced significant barriers to acceptance in the professional art world, encountering both overt and subtle discrimination.
In art, women were often depicted as objects, models, or sources of inspiration for male artists, rather than being recognized as artists themselves. The societal position of women and the existence of unequal gender roles have significantly shaped the fundamental concerns of Jürgenssen's work from the outset.
Before her death at the age of 54 in 2003, Jürgenssen left behind a diverse body of work, including photographs, drawings, paintings, and graphic works, installations, and body art. Through these mediums, she explored the lived experiences of women, their fears and suffering, and the patriarchal prejudices they face. Jürgenssen’s art critiques social conventions, gender roles, beauty standards, and the dynamics between the sexes, often employing a surrealist style with ironic undertones.
She questioned the dominance of male desire and deconstructed the myth of power. Among the many works that have challenged misogyny, this article highlights twelve pieces that represent her thoughts and concerns over three decades of artistic activism. These works are categorized into four groups, each illustrating a common form of objectification of women.
 
Conclusions
Birgit Jürgenssen, a prominent Austrian feminist artist, has critiqued the objectification of women in many of her works. This article examines four distinct types of her critiques:

Stereotyping Women as Housewives: Jürgenssen portrays the lived experiences of women relegated to the role of housewives through nightmarish scenes filled with despair. Despite their talents, abilities, and aspirations, these women are trapped in a restrictive gender role.
Fetishistic Representation of High Heels: Jürgenssen uses a collection of shoes she designed to symbolically express the objectification and fetishization of the female body. High heels, which often cause muscular and skeletal pain for women, are nonetheless marketed and celebrated as a masculine fashion statement.
Women as Reproductive Tools: Equating women with nature serves as a method of exerting control over their bodies. This reductive view ignores women's feelings, independence, and personal desires, contributing to their objectification.
Masks Concealing Women's True Selves: Jürgenssen’s masks symbolize transformation, collapse, and disintegration, as well as retreat and refuge. While she confronts the viewer, the mask obstructs her ability to speak or even breathe.

Through her art, Jürgenssen exposes the cultural codes accepted in society that impose oppressive and limiting boundaries on women's lives and challenges the justifications for inequality.  

Abstract Introduction
The formation of the subject and its transformation in connection with the symbolic realm is aware of the reciprocal interaction between the individual and the social realm from the very beginning. Our basic question is whether Lacanian psychoanalysis and his concept of the unconscious subject were able to breathe new life into political theory and socio-political analysis. Lacan believed in a socio-political analysis based on psychoanalysis, even if this objective field cannot be reduced to traditional essentialist views of social objectivity. Moreover, the link between psychoanalysis and politics does not mean that we create a single meta-discourse by linking the two fields. Psychoanalysis has always been present in the political realm in different ways. The meaning of civilizational and social values and the nature of individual desire are in conflict with each other. Society is a restrictive process that makes the individual a victim of the collective, and there is no way to circumvent it, even under the freest or most permissive social conditions.
Materials & Methods
the research method used in this study is descriptive-analytical. First, Lacan's thoughts on the concepts of the subject, the lack, the other, the political and the relationships between them are examined and analyzed. We will then evaluate the possibility or impossibility of the political on the basis of various positions. The author has made an effort to gather important themes from written documents, library sources and reputable databases in order to analyze and compare them.
Discussion & Result
Psychoanalysis is pessimistic about idealistic approaches to politics, and even those that seem desirable at first sight are confronted with a kind of aporia and contradiction. From this perspective, a politics that has its origins in Lacanian psychoanalysis is not only concerned with maintaining the status quo, but always seeks to uncover the lack in the symbolic realm and, consequently, change and transformation. However, not all change can be permanent and stable, and the construction of any form of ideology is ultimately impossible. This politics not only challenges existing laws and norms, but also gives no space to major beliefs and political parties. In psychoanalysis, the return of lack is a revolutionary and transformative event that the symbolic realm deals with on various levels. On the other hand, each symbolic realm has a center of gravity that it seeks to preserve and maintain in order to avoid its own collapse. Since the elimination of the real element is necessary, psychoanalysis adapts to the inevitability of lack. Therefore, Lacanian politics aims to expose violence, elimination and lack, rather than offering a positive and definitive solution to it.
Conclusion
 
There are moments in psychoanalysis that play an important role in analysing political and social phenomena. Identifying the hidden layers of power and violence, criticising ideology and exposing the fundamental flaw within the symbolic order can be seen as the most important task of the political. The central insight of psychoanalysis in the social and political realm lies in its focus on the lack within the symbolic order and the big Other. Psychoanalysis has a stabilising function insofar as it assigns a fixed purpose and definition to the subject, the Other and the lack inherent in them; at the same time, it exposes the contradictions and obstacles within subjectivity and the symbolic order. Psychoanalysis is fundamentally political and capable of intervening directly in the political realm. However, this intervention is not aimed at advancing positive ideologies (such as liberalism or feminism); but identifies the elements that are excluded in the formation of ideology. The acceptance of the lack means the emergence of political and progressive political transformations — transformations that idealist approaches have previously prevented by preventing the uncovering of such hidden layers within political identities.

Abstract Introduction
Traditional Jewish theology prior to Holocaust comprised a broad and fluid body of thought that defined the framework of Jewish religious life. This framework faced challenges when confronted with modernity, which exposed its strengths and weaknesses. Holocaust intensified these challenges to an unprecedented degree. It is not merely a historical event or an internal religious crisis but a phenomenon with extensive civilizational dimensions, leaving deep and lasting impacts across diverse spheres of human life. Therefore, this research will also examine the reflections of Holocaust in areas such as politics, culture and art, society, education, and media.
Materials & Methods
The authors do not regard themselves as historians of Holocaust, and their discussion is not aimed at affirming or refuting the event. Rather, they have sought to narrate it through the lens of its impact on the minds and language of Jewish thinkers. Consequently, their research is phenomenological, not historical. Consistent with the study's nature, the research materials are primarily based on library documents and media archives.
Discussion & Result
Consistent with this phenomenological analysis, Holocaust engendered a profound crisis in Jewish theology, demonstrating that traditional theological responses were no longer adequate to explain or endure such an experience. This inadequacy was not merely an abstract issue but an existential and faith-based crisis that compelled Jewish thinkers and theologians to undertake a difficult endeavor of rethinking the most fundamental concepts. Martin Buber (1878–1965) argued that God's silence during the dark events of history does not signify His absence or non-existence, but rather an eclipse rooted in the wicked deeds of human beings and the destruction of what he termed the sphere of between. Abraham Joshua Heschel (1907–1972) placed the responsibility for this evil not on God but on humanity and its misuse of God-given freedom, arguing that God's apparent silence at Auschwitz was not a sign of His absence or indifference, but a manifestation of His boundless sorrow and deep empathy for the victims. Eliezer Berkovits (1908–1992) contended that God has opened a space for genuine human freedom and choice through the voluntary self-limitation of His power. Mordecai Menahem Kaplan (1881–1983) redefined Jewish theology by categorically rejecting a supernatural, intervening God of history and proposing the concept of God-Process.
Holocaust tragically demonstrated that modern states may not only fail to preserve the dignity and lives of their citizens but are also capable of becoming the primary, organized agent of their destruction. Furthermore, the legacy of the Holocaust and the deep sensitivities arising from it have become a powerful tool in current political and media discourses. One of its most serious and controversial manifestations is the definition, interpretation, and use of the concept of antisemitism, especially when the critique of the policies of Israel's regime is involved. This situation raises fundamental questions concerning the boundaries of freedom of speech, legitimate political criticism, and instrumentalization of historical suffering for political objectives. There is increasing evidence suggesting that the accusation of antisemitism has become a tool to suppress political critiques of Israel's regime.
On a social level, the Holocaust was not only a genocide but also the experience of a type of social death and a profound collapse of interpersonal trust and human solidarity. Moreover, Holocaust demonstrated that science and education, when lacking a moral orientation and social responsibility, can be transformed into tools for legitimizing deadly ideologies and justifying atrocities. If culture and art had previously often served to represent beauty, wisdom, transcendence, and progress, after Auschwitz they could no longer easily overlook suffering, destruction, and the questioning of history's purpose. The duality in artistic approaches indicates that post-Holocaust culture has been constantly grappling with the fundamental question of how such an experience can be depicted, and the delicate line between ethical testimony, artistic creativity, educational necessity, and avoiding commercial or political trivialization and abuse.
Media also played a vital and dual role during and after Holocaust. On the one hand, many Nazi German publications, radio stations, and cinema became powerful instruments of the regime's official propaganda. On the other hand, after the war, journalists, photographers, and documentary filmmakers played a decisive role in shaping global public memory by recording and exposing the horrific images from camps like Auschwitz and Dachau. These contradictory experiences highlighted the media's crucial role in either reinforcing discourses of hatred or the normalization of evil, or conversely, in exposing truth, fostering critical awareness, and strengthening collective responsibility, demonstrating that the representation of events in the media has a direct impact on the formation of historical memory and society's moral judgment.
Conclusion
Holocaust challenged the foundations of traditional Jewish theology, prompting fundamental questions about God's presence or absence, divine justice, the meaning of the Covenant and the Chosen People, and the possibility of faith after Auschwitz. In response to this crisis, prominent thinkers sought to resolve this fragility of belief and find a path for the continuation of intellectual and spiritual life by offering novel answers. In the political sphere, the event led to a crisis of confidence in states and a reappraisal of the moral legitimacy of laws, setting the stage for geopolitical shifts, such as the strengthening and acceleration of the Zionist movement. This research specifically emphasized the crucial distinction between antisemitism and legitimate critique of the policies of the State of Israel and the Zionist movement. It showed how the concept of antisemitism is sometimes instrumentalized to suppress any critique of Zionism and block academic and critical discourse, a phenomenon that threatens freedom of expression and poisons the space for healthy dialogue. In the sphere of culture and art, Holocaust created a great challenge for its representation, leading to the formation of a collective memory based on the necessity of bearing witness or recounting the experience. In the social context, it exposed the collapse of trust, the deterioration of solidarity, and the complexities of the gray zone. It implicated educational and cultural institutions in the issue of the politicization of knowledge, and it placed the media in a dual role in shaping public memory and representation. All this evidence confirms that Holocaust became a point of rupture in modern Western civilization, a rupture that challenged the optimistic faith in linear progress, instrumental rationality, the rule of law, the neutrality of science, social solidarity, and the possibility of fully representing reality, thereby posing fundamental epistemological questions about the nature of historical knowledge and collective memory.

Abstract Introduction
 
In the context of twentieth-century existential phenomenology, Martin Heidegger's concept of conscience (Gewissen) in Being and Time offers a radical departure from both theological and Kantian moral traditions. Instead of understanding conscience as a faculty of moral judgment or as the voice of divine command, Heidegger conceives it as a silent existential call a call that disrupts Dasein's immersion in the everyday and recalls it to the possibility of authentic existence. In his fundamental ontology, conscience does not provide moral content or guidance, but rather initiates a transformation in how Dasein relates to its own being. This paper aims to examine this existential structure of conscience, analyze its ontological roots, and distinguish it from conventional ethical and religious interpretations.
 
 
 
Materials & Methods
 
This research employs a hermeneutic-phenomenological method in analyzing Heidegger’s Being and Time, with a particular focus on sections §§54–60, where the theme of conscience is explicitly articulated. The study interprets key Heideggerian categories such as fallenness (Verfallen), resoluteness (Entschlossenheit), thrownness (Geworfenheit), and authenticity (Eigentlichkeit) to situate the phenomenon of conscience within the ontological analytic of Dasein.
In addition to a close reading of the original German and English translations of Heidegger’s text, this paper also critically examines contemporary commentaries from Hubert Dreyfus, Charles Guignon, and Richard Capobianco to highlight the diversity of interpretations concerning the ontological or moral status of conscience. Sources from both primary literature and secondary scholarship in English and Persian have been used to ensure conceptual clarity and cross-traditional relevance.
 
Discussion & Result
 
Heidegger’s analysis reveals that conscience is not a normative faculty but an existential event that discloses Dasein’s thrownness and urges it toward resolute existence. The “call” of conscience is characterized by its silenceit “says” nothing, issues no command, and offers no judgment. Instead, it interrupts Dasein's absorption in the public world of “Das Man” and exposes the inauthenticity of conformist life. As Heidegger asserts, “What conscience calls us to is not any particular action, but simply our ownmost potentiality-for-being-guilty”.
This call, however, is not to be conflated with guilt in the moral sense. It is an ontological guilt arising from the finitude and facticity of existence. Dasein is guilty not because of moral transgressions, but because it always already lives amidst neglected possibilities. Responding to this call requires resoluteness, a stance in which Dasein fully owns its thrown condition and assumes its existential responsibility without recourse to moral universals.
In contrast to the Kantian understanding, where conscience is bound to the authority of the categorical imperative, Heidegger’s conscience lacks content and normativity. While Kant sees conscience as rational self-legislation, Heidegger redefines it as a disclosure of being. The ethical implication here is profound: it shifts the foundation of responsibility from universal law to the individual’s authentic relation to being.
 
Among interpreters, Dreyfus maintains that Heidegger's conscience is radically non-moral and even anti-ethical. For him, the call merely disrupts, without guiding, and thus reveals no concrete direction for action. Guignon on the other hand, detects within Heidegger's existential framework a form of implied moralitya responsibility to self and possibly to others grounded in authenticity rather than moral norms. Capobianco presents a metaphysical reading, asserting that the call of conscience represents Being’s way of disclosing itself through Dasein, emphasizing not personal ethics but ontological receptivity.
 
This paper argues that while Heidegger deliberately avoids moral language, conscience nonetheless initiates a space where responsibility is made possible—not as a set of duties, but as the existential necessity of owning one’s being. The call does not dictate, but opens; it is a call to respond, not a rule to obey.
 
Conclusion
 
The existential analysis of conscience in Being and Time reveals a profound transformation in the understanding of responsibility, guilt, and moral agency. Conscience, as Heidegger presents it, is neither theological nor rational in the traditional sense. It is a pre-ethical phenomenon that enables authentic decision-making by confronting Dasein with its own thrownness and finitude. The “silent voice” of conscience strips away the chatter of the everyday, enabling the self to hear the quiet urgency of its ownmost being.
 
This research shows that Heidegger’s notion of conscience, while free from moral prescriptivism, lays the groundwork for a new understanding of responsibility grounded in ontological freedom. It challenges us to rethink conscience not as the judge of actions, but as the silent harbinger of authenticity. In doing so, it opens the way for an existential ethics—not rooted in laws or norms, but in the courage to listen to one’s being and choose resolutely.

Abstract Introduction
Modernity is known for ideas such as freedom, equality, and democracy, but how were modern ideas formed? What is the basis of these ideas? Modernity considers these ideas to be the most rational concepts possible for life. Nietzsche and Heidegger are two thinkers who genealogize modernity and its ideas. From their perspective, modern ideas are historically constructed and draw a direct and inevitable historical line for humanity; that is, modernity introduces its reality as a universal truth. From the perspective of Nietzsche and Heidegger, modernity is a metaphysical thought because it attributes a fixed essence to existence and man and imagines the subject as a fully active being with the power of great change and ignores the role of history and society in the construction of his existence.
Methodology
 This article looks at the language-power-event relationship in the thought of Nietzsche and Heidegger from a poststructuralist perspective and uses the method of contextual interpretation to analyze their texts.
Findings
 As a result, from the perspective of Nietzsche and Heidegger, modernity not only does not lead to freedom, but also conceals power relations. This concealment occurs especially within language. Accordingly, the article examines the relationship between language and power in the thought of Nietzsche and Heidegger and then assesses their relationship with the event as a path to liberation. Nietzsche shows that the will to truth is a cover for the will to power. He shows that truth is constructed based on the linguistic presuppositions of the subject. Therefore, the transformation of power becomes possible only through the selection of new linguistic assumptions. Hence, only a new linguistic experience can create an untimely event. In this sense, Nietzsche cuts the relationship between truth and language. In his view, man is a historical being and experiences life solely based on his linguistic assumptions. That is, language - as a medium - has an impact on what we see. In other words, Nietzsche does not consider language to be a transparent and neutral tool for acquiring knowledge. Therefore, when the social values ​​of the ruling class are established as truth in the form of concepts and signs of language, then the power of the elite is consolidated and perpetuated. In other words, our encounter with the world occurs through metaphorical and figurative language, and any knowledge or speculation about the world is also imbued with this metaphorical and figurative language. However, changing linguistic assumptions can lead to the achievement of a new perspective and, as a result, a different knowledge. In short, Nietzsche shows that power operates through language, that is, the institutionalization of the social values ​​of the ruling class and then their transformation into norms, ethics, and law occurs through language.
Heidegger also reminds us that the experience of being is made possible through language, that is, any experience and understanding of the world is linguistic. In this sense, not only is being essentially linguistic and linguistic assumptions create our type of knowledge, but the lack of questioning about the nature of language automatically leads to forgetting being.
Discussion and conclusion
The result of this is that, according to Heidegger, the use of language in a different form, for example, the language of poetry, can make our understanding of the world different. The genealogy of the modern subject in Foucault's thought can be considered the result of a combination of the perspectives of Nietzsche and Heidegger. Foucault shows that the subject is formed within discourses - as a linguistic construct. In this sense, a space for experiencing the new requires the occurrence of a new language, which at the macro level means a transformation in the knowledge system of an era, something like scientific revolutions of the Kuhnian type, and at the micro level, it is a doubt about the norms that govern personally or collectively. In general, Nietzsche and Heidegger believe that our interpretation of the world changes with the change of our language. Therefore, they are skeptical about the definitive and absolute beliefs and assumptions of the modern era. That is, ideals such as truth and reason were questioned at the level of ontology and epistemology. They noted that our linguistic assumptions affect who we are and how we understand the world. So they focused on language-power to show that power is more than an external thing, it is an internal thing that lies within our language, and that such language-power not only constitutes truth but also justifies the definitive path of societies. But what can disrupt this path is an event of language.

Abstract Introduction:
The nature of war occupies a central position in the intellectual architectures of both Carl Schmitt and Max Scheler. While Schmitt's political philosophy treats war as an ontological constant rooted in the friend-enemy distinction, Scheler approaches it as a moral phenomenon, especially in the context of World War I, where he seeks to uncover its spiritual and ethical dimensions. Despite their differing methodologies, both thinkers converge in their critique of liberalism and, to a lesser extent, communism. Their reflections on war and sacrifice challenge the moral and political assumptions of modernity, revealing deeper metaphysical tensions.
Materials & Methods:
The research method of this study is descriptive-analytical and comparative. In the first step, Carl Schmitt's views on war as an ontological construct based on the friend-enemy distinction and its relationship with the concept of self-sacrifice, as well as Max Scheler's perspective emphasizing the ethical-theological dimensions of war and its role in the flourishing of spiritual values will be described and analyzed. In the final step, by comparing these two viewpoints, emphasis will be placed on both their fundamental differences and their common ground.
Discussion & Result:
To grasp Schmitt's conception of war, one must first understand his definition of the political. For Schmitt, the political is not a domain among others; it is a qualitative intensity that emerges wherever human collectives confront existential opposition. Any issue becomes political when its adherents are willing to risk conflict or death for it. Thus, religion, class, or ideology can become political when they generate enemies.
The friend-enemy distinction is the core of Schmitt's political ontology. The enemy is not merely a competitor or adversary but a public figure whose existence negates our own. In this sense, Schmitt's thought echoes Descartes: "I think, therefore I am," but it takes on an existential aspect until it is finally clarified in a declaration mediated by the situation: "I think, therefore I have enemies; I have enemies, therefore I am." At this point, it is necessary to clarify what "existential" meant for Schmitt.
War, then, is the ultimate political act—a manifestation of existential differentiation. It can be external or internal, just or total, but it always reflects the intensity of political identity.
Schmitt critiques the liberal world order's emphasis on peace and humanitarianism as an ideological camouflage for economic imperialism. Concepts like "human rights" and "democracy" are deployed not to prevent war but to moralize and totalize it. The enemy becomes a criminal, a monster, excluded from humanity, thus justifying annihilation through modern technologies like the atomic bomb.
 

Scheler and a Moral-Theological Understanding of War

 
For Max Scheler, World War I was not merely a historical event but the greatest occurrence in the moral realm—a moment that catalyzed his philosophical reflections on the nature of war. In this context, Scheler viewed the war as a revelation of trans-utilitarian values such as power, honor, and selflessness, which he believed formed the spiritual foundation of the German nation and state. Theologically, the war represented God's judgment on earth, a transformative event that could awaken humanity to the truth of its existence.

Even in death, the soldier achieves a form of divine truth, as war elevates the individual beyond selfish concerns.
Socially, war is a blessing, guiding people from egocentrism to altruism.
Scheler thus characterizes war as a vital and creative surge of life, striving toward the highest moral values.

From this perspective, World War I is not a classic battle but a war against the increasing mechanization of nature, radical individualistic feelings against social bonds, and a battle against the capitalist spirit that is penetrating all forms of human existence. This war is a resistance against the rising tide of Enlightenment ideas and, once again, demonstrates the undeniable originality of the German people . Therefore, what makes the German battle in World War I a just war is the character of this nation's opponents, led by the British. "The main battle in World War I is the struggle between the spiritual German 'culture' against the materialistic and superficial 'civilization' of England and France" .Scheler argues that capitalist values redirect the human soul away from infinite divine love toward a passion for finite, material goods. Viewed through a materialist lens, war appears futile. Yet, Scheler insists that war is intimately tied to the creative power of the nation, capable of shaping a morally ordered world.
Conclusion:
While both Scheler and Carl Schmitt articulate a form of theology of war, their foundations diverge:

Schmitt's conception is political, grounded in sovereignty and the state of exception.
Scheler's is moral-theological, emphasizing spiritual transformation and ethical elevation.

Despite these differences, both thinkers converge on the notion that self-sacrifice in war reveals the existential truth of the human being. Whether rooted in moral ideals or territorial identity, this sacrifice stands in stark contrast to liberalism's superficial advocacy for peace. In reality, Scheler and Schmitt argue, liberalism masks its pursuit of total war, colonization, and material domination—a project mirrored by the Communist International through class warfare.

Abstract Introduction:
The history of the postmodern movement can be traced back to the 1960s as a reaction to the school of modernism. Through that movement, many thinkers developed the core of the postmodern school of thought by proposing their own ideas. The first and most influential of them is the Frenchman Jean-François Lyotard, the founder of French postmodern thought. Attention to human social-cultural life in the postmodern situation constitutes the hallmark and characteristic of Lyotard's postmodern intellectual style. Accordingly, the opinions presented by this thinker are classified as socio-cultural opinions. This article aims to prove, through rigorous studies, that the foundation of the components of progressive and contemporary postmodern art is rooted in the most prominent aspects of Lyotard's cultural and social theories. The fundamental question in this context is what is the quality of the influence of progressive postmodern art on Lyotard's postmodern thoughts?
 Materials & Methods:
The present article obtains appropriate scientific data through library study and, using an analytical-comparative method, adapts the most prominent components of progressive and contemporary postmodern art to Lyotard's ideas. In order to achieve this goal, this research, while thoroughly studying the most prominent components of progressive and contemporary postmodern art, explores the relationship between those theoretical and applied components and Lyotard's theoretical cultural and social aspects. Finally, by comparing those aspects and components, it explains the extent and quality of the influence of the theoretical-applied indicators of progressive postmodern art on the postmodern cultural-social views of that thinker. The present article obtains its data on Lyotard's postmodern socio-cultural theoretical views through a library study of the book The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. On the other hand, in the data analysis section, the article has studied a suitable analysis of the quality of the most prominent theoretical components of postmodern art, which have close theoretical overlap with Lyotard's socio-cultural theoretical aspects. Finally, in order to achieve its goal, the article will adapt the results of data analysis in the final section - discussion and conclusion - and explain the role of these aspects in the components of progressive postmodern art. Therefore, the method and study approach of the article will be citation-inference and the data analysis method will be analytical-adaptive.
 Discussion & Result:
In deep theoretical scrutiny, it is clear that Lyotard's socio-cultural theoretical aspects correspond to the most prominent artistic-performance components of progressive and contemporary postmodern art. This overlap is significant and contains the answer to the main question of the article. In clear terms, progressive and contemporary postmodern art has established special components in order to fulfill its mission, and the most prominent of those components have gained their true articulation with the support of the postmodern views of the founders of this school of thought - especially Lyotard. This is considered one of the important results and findings of the research. An inferential adaptation of the research findings reveals the influence of Lyotard's socio-cultural views on the components of progressive and contemporary postmodern art;

A) Special components in progressive and contemporary postmodern art:

1- Rejection of individualism
2 - Art and metanarratives
3 - Deconstruction
4 - Subversion and aesthetics
5 - Reality and Truth
6 - The art and play of language
7 - Reality and Perception
8 - Interaction and Culture
9 - Awareness and awareness-raising
10 - Multiple realities

B) Fundamental Aspects of Lyotard's Socio-Cultural Thoughts:

1 - Consensus and Legitimization
2 - Rejection of metanarrativeism
3 - Need to change
4 - Subversion
5 - Rejection of modernist relations
6 - A new language game
7 - Perception in a new situation and perception of the new situation
8 - Postmodern socio-cultural relations
9 - Truth, awareness and awareness-raising
10 - Pluralism and pluralism
Conclusion:
The result of this research is of a qualitative-fundamental type and reveals that progressive and contemporary postmodern art is deeply and continues to be influenced by the philosophical worldview and socio-cultural theories of the postmodern school of thought - especially Lyotard's ideas. Consensus and legitimization, negation of metanarrative, need for change and subversion, negation of modernist relations, new language play, perception of the new situation, postmodern socio-cultural relations, consciousness and pluralism in postmodernity, are the fundamental aspects of Lyotard's socio-cultural theory, which have theoretical overlap with the most prominent artistic-performance components of progressive and contemporary postmodern art. This is one of the key findings of the study.