Research Paper
Salman sadeghizadeh
Abstract
IntroductionIf we consider “the modern" as a phenomenon without a single focus, then we can talk about different types of the modern and, as a result, discuss the "transformation" of the modern. However, if we consider the modern as a single totality that has a single focus, then we can no longer ...
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IntroductionIf we consider “the modern" as a phenomenon without a single focus, then we can talk about different types of the modern and, as a result, discuss the "transformation" of the modern. However, if we consider the modern as a single totality that has a single focus, then we can no longer talk about transformation in the modern because the assumption of the "uniqueness" of the modern is in conflict with talking about its transformation; this is exactly the point in which “Metamorphosis” becomes the main category for explaining transformation in the modern. Metamorphosis is a term that has entered the humanities from the empirical sciences and refers to the stages of development of an organism. Therefore, talking about Gestalt Metamorphosis in the modern is primarily about accepting the hypothesis that the modern has a single totality and that its internal Metamorphosis cannot be considered in the sense of ontological breaks. Of course, this Metamorphosis is accompanied by important epistemological breaks. This article shows that in the context of the new-coming Western civilization, we are witnessing the emergence of a new gestalt of the modern, which can be explained within the framework of “reflexive modernity.” Today, it is this reflexive modernity that has created and established a completely distinct gestalt of the modern. Materials and Methods The article recruits the Gestalt theory as its main approach to comprehend metamorphosis in the modern. Gestalt theory connotates a perception that emphasises the processing of entire patterns and configurations, and not merely individual components. However, the Gestalt approach has been used less in sociological fields. While this approach is based on principles that can determine the trajectory of social research and provide a new context for their explanation. For this reason, the present article attempts to explain the process of transformation in the "modern" by using the Gestalt approach and show how the modern has undergone a kind of metamorphosis in the context of the new-coming Western civilization and, as a result, the modern subject has found a different perception of modernity. In order to apply this theoretical approach, we must first understand its fundamental principles. therefore, we briefly explain those principles that play a role in explaining the Gestalt transformation of the modern. Discussion and ResultThe economic gestalt of modernity was accompanied by the emergence of a structure called “Society” that emerged as a result of the dissolution of “communities”. Therefore, Western civilization in the period of mid-modernity can be considered a “social civilization.” However, the collapse of this gestalt and the emergence of the reflexive gestalt of modernity were in turn accompanied by a metamorphosis in the civilizational dimension. Today, it can be said with certainty that the newly emerging Western civilization is emptying itself of its “social aspect.” In this midst, we are witnessing the emergence of an “individual-oriented civilization” that has the same essential power as the previous “social civilization.” In fact, reflexive modernity is concerned with the emergence of a new individuality that transforms the social sphere of modernity into an individual-oriented sphere and replaces a subjective perspective with a structured perspective, thus transforming all social relations radically. ConclusionAccording to the main hypothesis of this article, the Gestalt metamorphosis of the modern and the emergence of a reflexive modernity occur in the context of a new civilization; a civilization that can be called an “individual-oriented civilization” and distinguished from a “social civilization.” In order to examine this hypothesis, we used the Gestalt approach of perception and based our analysis on a number of key principles of this approach.According to the principle of “field-form,” which can be explained on the basis of the “pregnancy” mechanism, the individual-oriented Western civilization has become a field in which the form of the modern is perceived. Since this individual-oriented civilization is strongly modernist, it has caused the sphere of influence of the modernist Gestalt dimension of the modern to expand and thus bring the foundations of modernity under its umbrella. This in itself also brings with it a kind of Gestalt metamorphosis in the modern; a metamorphosis that can be explained in its final stage on the basis of the principle of overshadowing.As we have already mentioned, this principle states that a visual structure as a whole may be composed of a number of smaller gestalts, but the larger gestalt, because it has a stronger prefiguration, ultimately determines the meaning of the smaller gestalts. Thus, with the expansion of the sphere of influence of modernism, the meaning of modernity has been overshadowed, and as a result, the totality of the gestalt of the modern has undergone a metamorphosis; a metamorphosis that concerns both the positive and the negative aspects. Radical Individualization can be a symbol of the negative aspect, and moderate individuation is a symbol of the positive aspect of this metamorphosis. Radical Individualization reduces the individual to a living being and empties him of content. The individualized individual is only a spectator consumer or a traditional imitator. He is either a slave of dictators or a tool in the hands of the markets. Such an individual is like a termite that eats and rots the tree of modernity from within. Totalitarian governments and unbridled capitalism are two great factories for the production of Radical individualism which alone can implode the order of reflexive modernity.
Research Paper
Amir hossein Kermani; Mohammad Jafar Ashkevari
Abstract
Abstract 3 Islamophobic sentiments, linking them to security concerns, migration issues, and cultural differences. By identifying recurring patterns in historical narratives, this study provides insights into the mechanisms through which Islamophobia persists in contemporary societies.Addressing ...
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Abstract 3 Islamophobic sentiments, linking them to security concerns, migration issues, and cultural differences. By identifying recurring patterns in historical narratives, this study provides insights into the mechanisms through which Islamophobia persists in contemporary societies.Addressing Islamophobia requires a critical reassessment of historical Christian-Muslim relations and a more nuanced understanding of religious and political interactions. The study underscores the importance of interfaith dialogue, education, and media literacy in challenging Islamophobic narratives. By fostering a more balanced and informed perspective on Islam, it is possible to counter misconceptions and promote mutual understanding between religious communities. Ultimately, this research contributes to ongoing efforts to combat Islamophobia by highlighting the significance of historical awareness and cross-cultural engagement in shaping more inclusive societies.Discussion and conclusionThis study explores the historical roots of Christian fear of Islam, shaped by the "geometry of faith and power," which influenced religious, political, and social interactions. Key factors include the absence of a true leader after the Prophet Muhammad, misinterpretations of jihad, "othering" through dividing the world into Dar al-Harb and Dar al-Islam, and material motivations behind conquests. These dynamics led to Islamic expansionism, confiscation of Christian lands, and retaliatory actions like the Crusades. Restrictive laws for non-Muslims, such as the jizya tax and forced conversions, further strained relations. While periods of tolerance existed, they were conditional and often influenced by political or economic factors. Misinterpretations of Quranic teachings, particularly jihad, contributed to both historical conflicts and modern Islamophobia. Addressing these issues requires critical reflection and revisiting religious interpretations, raising the question: Who truly represents Islam?
Research Paper
Mahnaz Farahmand; Asal Razavi
Abstract
Introduction
The Cartesian subject and Kant’s transcendental perception are considered the foundations of modern epistemology. The evolution of the concept of the subject from Descartes to Hegel shows its deep connection with modernity. Modern thought largely defines itself in relation to the ...
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Introduction
The Cartesian subject and Kant’s transcendental perception are considered the foundations of modern epistemology. The evolution of the concept of the subject from Descartes to Hegel shows its deep connection with modernity. Modern thought largely defines itself in relation to the idea of the subject, either by reaffirming or criticizing it. Initially, philosophers like Descartes and Kant viewed the subject as an independent consciousness that perceives the object. Descartes saw the subject as central and superior to the object, while Kant emphasized the subject's inherent awareness. In contrast, thinkers like Hume, Marx, and Foucault challenged the primacy of the subject. Hume denied the unity of the mind; Locke stressed objective reality independent of perception; Marx described the subject’s alienation under capitalism; and Nietzsche reinterpreted subjectivity through power relations. Philosophers like Vico and Herder offered a middle path, emphasizing historical knowledge and evolving reason. Hegel introduced self-consciousness, suggesting that awareness of objects must accompany self-awareness. Heidegger critiqued the Cartesian-Kantian notion of a transcendental subject, arguing it perpetuated metaphysical subjectivism. Foucault extended Heidegger’s critique by analyzing subjectivity through power, knowledge, and discourse, showing that resistance and subjugation are intertwined. Through history, philosophers treated the subject as a crucial concept. Heidegger and Foucault, in particular, examined how technology and discourse shape and control subjectivity. This study compares their views to clarify the evolution of the subject.
Materials & Methods
This research first gathers information from books and articles on Heidegger and Foucault, then compares their views. Heidegger criticizes Cartesian philosophy, particularly its subject-object separation, which he believes leads to a mechanical and technological view of the world. Instead, he emphasizes Dasein — the being-in-the-world — highlighting the intertwined relationship between humans and their environment. Heidegger rejects both realism and idealism, proposing a phenomenological approach that seeks to understand lived human experience directly, beyond abstract metaphysical frameworks.
Through Dasein, Heidegger portrays existence as dynamic and interpretive, not a static self-awareness. Human beings are always already embedded in a historical and cultural context, shaping and interpreting the world around them. Heidegger’s critique extends to epistemology; he challenges Kantian and Cartesian models, arguing that true knowledge stems from a primordial understanding of being, not abstract logic.
In discussing technology, Heidegger warns that it reduces beings to mere resources, concealing their true essence. However, he does not simply oppose technology; he calls for a deeper understanding of its essence, Ge-stell (enframing), where existence reveals itself through technological thinking. Heidegger stresses that Being itself resists human domination; existence cannot be fully controlled through will or technology.
Overall, Heidegger’s notion of subjectivity dismantles the Cartesian dualism of subject and object, proposing instead a dynamic, relational view of human existence deeply intertwined with Being and world.
Foucault, on the other hand, explores how modern power structures shape and produce subjects. He defines the subject in two ways: as one subjected to external control, and as one who forms an identity through self-awareness. Both involve forms of subjugation under pervasive systems of power.
Foucault emphasizes that power operates not just in formal institutions but permeates every layer of society through political technologies. These mechanisms not only create social hierarchies but also turn individuals into objects of knowledge and control. In modernity, despite appearing autonomous, subjects are deeply embedded within systems of surveillance, discipline, and normalization.
The body becomes a key site for the exercise of power: monitored, disciplined, and rendered an object of study. Foucault argues that individuals are shaped, rather than self-formed, by these systems, undermining the notion of autonomous subjectivity.
Both thinkers critically examine how modernity affects the concept of the subject. Heidegger focuses on the metaphysical and existential dimensions, while Foucault highlights the socio-political and disciplinary mechanisms that constitute human beings in modern societies.
Discussion & Result
This research explores and compares Heidegger's and Foucault’s perspectives on subjectivity and modernity. Heidegger criticizes Cartesian philosophy for its separation of subject and object, arguing that it leads to a mechanical understanding of reality. Instead, he proposes the concept of Dasein — being-in-the-world — emphasizing the interconnectedness of humans and their environment. Rejecting both realism and idealism, Heidegger advances a phenomenological approach centered on direct, lived experience.
Through Dasein, Heidegger portrays human existence as historically and culturally embedded rather than simply self-aware. He also challenges traditional epistemology, asserting that authentic knowledge arises from a primordial grasp of Being, not from abstract reasoning. Regarding technology, Heidegger warns that technological thinking reduces all entities to mere resources, hiding their true essence. His concept of Ge-stell (enframing) explains how technology frames and organizes our perception of existence, though he maintains that Being itself ultimately resists human domination. Heidegger redefines subjectivity as dynamic and relational, opposing Cartesian dualism.
In contrast, Foucault examines how modern power structures produce and control subjects. He sees the subject both as externally dominated and as self-formed through internalized practices shaped by power. Power, according to Foucault, operates beyond formal institutions, penetrating everyday life through political technologies that create social norms and systems of surveillance and discipline. The body becomes a key site for exercising control, illustrating how individuals are molded by external forces rather than being fully autonomous.
Both thinkers critique modernity’s impact on the human condition — Heidegger through an existential lens and Foucault through socio-political analysis.
Conclusion
Michel Foucault and Martin Heidegger both examined subjects like power, technology, and the modern condition, though with different approaches. Heidegger viewed technology ontologically, seeing it as a force that turns nature and humans into exploitable resources, alienating humanity from true Being. He warned against the "Enframing" mindset and called for a return to reflective, poetic ways of engaging with existence. In contrast, Foucault saw technology as practices and discourses linked to power, operating within institutions like prisons and hospitals. He highlighted "technologies of the self," through which individuals could shape their identities and resist dominant powers. Foucault argued that power is both repressive and productive, always offering possibilities for resistance. Together, their views offer a deep critique of modernity and suggest different strategies for confronting technological domination.
Research Paper
Nadia Ansari; Farideh Afarin; Saeed Moghimi
Abstract
Introduction, Material and Methods
This article adopts a theoretical-analytical approach, drawing upon the philosophical concepts of Heidegger and Derrida, to critically examine the intersection between deconstruction theory and architecture. It aims to demonstrate how the principles of deconstruction ...
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Introduction, Material and Methods
This article adopts a theoretical-analytical approach, drawing upon the philosophical concepts of Heidegger and Derrida, to critically examine the intersection between deconstruction theory and architecture. It aims to demonstrate how the principles of deconstruction can challenge and reinterpret traditional notions of form, structure, and function.This study, using an analytical-interpretive method and based on documentary sources, examines the relationship between philosophy and architecture with a focus on the deconstructive elements in Eisenman’s works, and by presenting an analytical model, analyzes the application of these concepts in the façades of Iranian-Islamic schools and proposes design suggestions.
Discussion and Result
In the philosophical thought of Martin Heideger, the concept of the “house” becomes a fundamental site for human dwelling within Being. Heidegger introduces language as the “house of Being” suggesting that true building is not merely the act of erecting physical structures, but rather an manifestation of authentic dwelling in the world. For Heidegger, dwelling precedes building; it is through language and being that humanity inhabits the world.
However, Jacques Derrida, through a critical reading of Heidegger, argues that despite Heidegger’s efforts to break from the metaphysical tradition, he remains within its structures. Derrida, with his theory of deconstruction, seeks to dismantle the established foundations of the philosophy of presence, introducing concepts such as différance, deferral, and trace into philosophical discourse. In this approach, meaning is never fixed or final; it remains perpetually suspended and deferred. Presence is never complete or absolute but always intertwind with absence and traces of the past.
These philosophical developments have significantly influenced the field of architecture as well. Just as deconstruction disrupts stabilized meanings in philosophy, it challenges the unity of form, certainty of structure, and clarity of function in architecture. Derrida’s notion of presence as always already marked by absence finds resonance in architecture, where invisible traces reshape our experience of space and time. This logic is particularly evident in the works of architects such as Peter Eisenman. Projects like the Waxner Center for the Arts and Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe embody principles of fragmentation, suspension, and instability, redefining architectural identity through disruption and dislocation.
In this context, linking Iranian architecture with deconstruction theory provides an apportunity for critical rethinking of traditional concepts. Iranian architecture, historically grounded in geometric coherence, spatial hierarchies, and symbolic functionality, when engaged with deconstruction, moves toward fragmentation, multiplicity, and ambiguity. Fragmented forms, asymmetrical compositions, the use of unconventional materials, and the deliberate subversion of conventional expectations become hallmarks of this approach, generating fluid and multulayered spatial experience. One specific domain where this fusion proves particularly transformative is the design of educational spaces. Traditionally, schools have been conceived as highly stryctured, orderly, and conservative environments. Under a deconstructive lens, however, they transform into open, dynamic, and interactive spaces. Instead of rigid compartmentalization and linear pathways, there emerges a natural, flowing connection between interior and exterior, an abundant presence of natural light, and movment pathways characterized by nonlinearity, ambiguity, and multiplicity.
Moreover, the facades of schools designed under deconstructive principles break away from symmetry and simplicity. Irregular forms, fractured surfaces, and the application of unconventional materials such as raw concrete, layered glass, or broken bricks create new visual and semantic challenges.These architectural experssions destabilize perception, inviting users to rethink traditional structures and experience space as an open-ended, evolving phenomenon.
In this trajectory, the concept of “trace”, central to Derrida’s deconstruction, acquires special significance. The trace—representing the absent presence of the past—can serve as a subtle yet powerful guide for reinterpreting Iranian architectural heritage. Educational spaces inspired by deconstruction can maintain a latent connection to history without resorting to direct imitation, embodying a suspended dialogue between the past and the future. Thus, architecture becomes neither a mere replication of tradition nor a complete severance from it, but an ongoing negotiation across temporal boundaries.
Conclusion
Ultimately, deconstruction does not signify the destruction of tradition, but rather the opening of hidden layers of meaning. It represents a process through which both architecture and philosophy move away from fixed representations toward experience that are open, multilayered, and dynamic. In this view, the fusion of Iranian architecture with deconstruction not only challenges conventional boundaries of form, function, and structure but also creates spaces for continual dwelling, experiencing, and rethinking.
From this perspective, the synthesis of Iranian architecture and deconstruction theory offers a potential starting point for creating works that exist on the thresholds between past and future, stability and instability, meaning and ambiguity. These architectural experiences remain perpetually open, unfinished, and in a state of becoming— inviting occupants not merely to inhabit space, but to engage with it critically and creatively.
Research Paper
Jalal Farzaneh Dehkordi
Abstract
Introduction
Hannah Arendt, prior to Foucault and Agamben, addressed biopolitics in her works without explicitly using the term. In The Origins of Totalitarianism and The Human Condition, she analyzes statelessness and the decline of the public realm, phenomena that lead to the erasure of human action ...
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Introduction
Hannah Arendt, prior to Foucault and Agamben, addressed biopolitics in her works without explicitly using the term. In The Origins of Totalitarianism and The Human Condition, she analyzes statelessness and the decline of the public realm, phenomena that lead to the erasure of human action and the reduction of the human being to mere biological existence. In contrast to Agamben’s life-denying conception of biopolitics, Arendt proposes the possibility of a life-affirming biopolitics through the concept of “natality.” Accordingly, framing Arendt’s political theory from the perspective of biopolitics not only deepens our understanding of her critique of death-bound modern power, but also highlights her reflections on a life-affirming biopolitics as a path toward liberation from the deadly logic of modernity, as seen in Auschwitz and the Gulags. This article, therefore, defines and contrasts both life-denying and life-affirming biopolitics and situates Arendt’s thought within these two strands. To clarify her position, the concepts of zoē, bios, and natality are first examined in their ontological interrelations, followed by an explanation of how they correspond to the various forms of human activity; namely labor, work and action.
Materials and Methods
Biopolitics emerges as an interdisciplinary field centered around the nature/society dualism, not to indicate a conflict between the two, but their interaction. Jean-Luc Nancy views biopolitics as a political order shaped by biological sciences, aiming to manage, surveil, and dominate individuals' lives. Biopolitics is not a side concern, but a form of politics where biological and social lives are intertwined. Here, life shapes politics, and politics shapes life. Biopolitics can be seen as a system of strategies connecting the human and natural sciences, directing population behavior, reproduction, and social ways of life integrated with biology. This creates a new break in governance practices, where political and biological spheres intersect, making life the focus of biopolitical interventions. Foucault highlights how biopolitics led to technologies of power centered on human biological processes, influencing not only biological management but also population organization within monitorable social structures. Roberto Esposito extends the concept by distinguishing between "life-affirming" biopolitics, which seeks to protect life, and "life-denying" biopolitics, seen in totalitarian regimes like Stalin's and Hitler's.
Discussion
In The Human Condition, Arendt identifies three fundamental human activities: labor, work, and action. Labor is tied to biological survival and the natural cycle of zoē; work is concerned with the fabrication of durable objects; and action, which corresponds to Aristotelian praxis, is linked to freedom, the appearance of the individual among others, and bios. Unlike labor and work, action is initiatory and capable of bringing about a new order. For Arendt, human natality is the basis of our capacity to begin anew and the condition of the possibility of political freedom. In Arendt’s thought, natality is a fundamental concept that opens the path to liberation from the monotony of biological life (zoē) and even the repetitiveness of social life (bios). Natality refers to the human capacity to initiate something new, an inherent potential that comes into the world with birth. Contrary to common assumptions, this potential does not emerge in separation from nature but rather in a creative engagement with it. Arendt develops this concept through her reading of Augustine, as well as Heidegger’s notion of thrownness. Just as Heidegger’s Dasein is a being thrown into the world without consent but still tasked with giving meaning to its existence, Arendt’s natality indicates that although humans are born into pre-given circumstances, they always retain the possibility of a new beginning. Thus, natality forms a bridge between zoē and bios: it emerges from biological life, yet through spontaneity and action, it transforms social and political existence. For Arendt, if a redemptive form of biopolitics is possible, it lies precisely where natality functions as the politicization of zoē, rather than the mere repetition of bios.
Conclusion
A biopolitical reading of Arendt’s thought clarifies that she theorized both of its strands, life-denying and life-affirming biopolitics. In The Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt offers a sociohistorical analysis that exemplifies thanato-politics, where human beings are reduced to mere biological life. In The Human Condition, she presents an ontological approach to human activity by distinguishing between labor, work, and action, and linking the Aristotelian concepts of zoē and bios to biological and political life. Within this framework, “natality”, the capacity to begin anew, becomes a central concept: the foundation of freedom and human action. Arendt blends Heideggerian ontology with political philosophy to define natality as a fundamental trait of the acting human being, a capacity that bridges the realms of life and politics. From this perspective, freedom is not a goal but the very existential condition of being human in the world. Natality, as a liberating force, not only prevents the reduction of political life to bare life but also enables a vitalist synthesis of bios and zoē. In Arendt’s view, political life is the arena in which human spontaneity manifests through collective action.
