Introduction:
The nature of war occupies a central position in the intellectual architectures of both Carl Schmitt and Max Scheler. While Schmitt's political philosophy treats war as an ontological constant rooted in the friend-enemy distinction, Scheler approaches it as a moral phenomenon, especially in the context of World War I, where he seeks to uncover its spiritual and ethical dimensions. Despite their differing methodologies, both thinkers converge in their critique of liberalism and, to a lesser extent, communism. Their reflections on war and sacrifice challenge the moral and political assumptions of modernity, revealing deeper metaphysical tensions.
Materials & Methods:
The research method of this study is descriptive-analytical and comparative. In the first step, Carl Schmitt's views on war as an ontological construct based on the friend-enemy distinction and its relationship with the concept of self-sacrifice, as well as Max Scheler's perspective emphasizing the ethical-theological dimensions of war and its role in the flourishing of spiritual values will be described and analyzed. In the final step, by comparing these two viewpoints, emphasis will be placed on both their fundamental differences and their common ground.
Discussion & Result:
To grasp Schmitt's conception of war, one must first understand his definition of the political. For Schmitt, the political is not a domain among others; it is a qualitative intensity that emerges wherever human collectives confront existential opposition. Any issue becomes political when its adherents are willing to risk conflict or death for it. Thus, religion, class, or ideology can become political when they generate enemies.
The friend-enemy distinction is the core of Schmitt's political ontology. The enemy is not merely a competitor or adversary but a public figure whose existence negates our own. In this sense, Schmitt's thought echoes Descartes: "I think, therefore I am," but it takes on an existential aspect until it is finally clarified in a declaration mediated by the situation: "I think, therefore I have enemies; I have enemies, therefore I am." At this point, it is necessary to clarify what "existential" meant for Schmitt.
War, then, is the ultimate political act—a manifestation of existential differentiation. It can be external or internal, just or total, but it always reflects the intensity of political identity.
Schmitt critiques the liberal world order's emphasis on peace and humanitarianism as an ideological camouflage for economic imperialism. Concepts like "human rights" and "democracy" are deployed not to prevent war but to moralize and totalize it. The enemy becomes a criminal, a monster, excluded from humanity, thus justifying annihilation through modern technologies like the atomic bomb.
 

Scheler and a Moral-Theological Understanding of War

 
For Max Scheler, World War I was not merely a historical event but the greatest occurrence in the moral realm—a moment that catalyzed his philosophical reflections on the nature of war. In this context, Scheler viewed the war as a revelation of trans-utilitarian values such as power, honor, and selflessness, which he believed formed the spiritual foundation of the German nation and state. Theologically, the war represented God's judgment on earth, a transformative event that could awaken humanity to the truth of its existence.

Even in death, the soldier achieves a form of divine truth, as war elevates the individual beyond selfish concerns.
Socially, war is a blessing, guiding people from egocentrism to altruism.
Scheler thus characterizes war as a vital and creative surge of life, striving toward the highest moral values.

From this perspective, World War I is not a classic battle but a war against the increasing mechanization of nature, radical individualistic feelings against social bonds, and a battle against the capitalist spirit that is penetrating all forms of human existence. This war is a resistance against the rising tide of Enlightenment ideas and, once again, demonstrates the undeniable originality of the German people . Therefore, what makes the German battle in World War I a just war is the character of this nation's opponents, led by the British. "The main battle in World War I is the struggle between the spiritual German 'culture' against the materialistic and superficial 'civilization' of England and France" .Scheler argues that capitalist values redirect the human soul away from infinite divine love toward a passion for finite, material goods. Viewed through a materialist lens, war appears futile. Yet, Scheler insists that war is intimately tied to the creative power of the nation, capable of shaping a morally ordered world.
Conclusion:
While both Scheler and Carl Schmitt articulate a form of theology of war, their foundations diverge:

Schmitt's conception is political, grounded in sovereignty and the state of exception.
Scheler's is moral-theological, emphasizing spiritual transformation and ethical elevation.

Despite these differences, both thinkers converge on the notion that self-sacrifice in war reveals the existential truth of the human being. Whether rooted in moral ideals or territorial identity, this sacrifice stands in stark contrast to liberalism's superficial advocacy for peace. In reality, Scheler and Schmitt argue, liberalism masks its pursuit of total war, colonization, and material domination—a project mirrored by the Communist International through class warfare.